Significant Case Digests
PENNSYLVANIA CASE DIGESTS
Genaeya Corp. v. Harco National Ins. Co.
2010 Pa Super 33
Decided: March 15, 2010
The Superior Court holds that a volunteer fire company’s emergency rescue expenses incurred at an auto accident scene are not damages for property damage for which the driver/insured is legally responsible. No coverage exists under the driver/insured’s auto policy. The Superior Court appears to accept the reasonable expectations doctrine in assessing coverage, aside from whether or not ambiguity is present.
Background
Genaeya, a motor carrier, contracted to transport a trailer load of property to a freight broker’s shipping facility. Upon delivery on a Friday, no one was at the facility to accept delivery, and Genaeya was instructed by the freight broker to leave the trailer on an adjoining lot. Upon the driver’s return the following week, it was discovered that the trailer and cargo were missing. Harco insured Genaeya under a cargo liability policy, and Genaeya tendered a claim made by the freight broker for the value of the missing cargo. Harco denied a defense, and Genaeya sued Harco. The trial court held that the policy language was vague and ambiguous, and must be construed in favor of Genaeya. The trial court also found a duty to indemnify. Harco appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court reverses the trial court’s decision. The court follows prior precedent that a duty to defend is contractual in nature. An insurer has no duty to defend unless the obligation is expressed specifically in the policy. In a case of first impression in Pennsylvania, the court agrees with Harco that the policy language (“We may elect to defend you against suits arising from claims of owners of property”) is not ambiguous and clearly conveys that Harco retains the discretion whether or not to defend Genaeya in any lawsuit.
With respect to the duty to indemnify, the Superior Court holds that the stipulated facts did not bring the claim within the policy coverage. The policy only covered trailers while attached to a covered auto. Here, the trailer was left unattended at the freight broker lot, and was not attached. The policy also allowed coverage if an unattached trailer was at a garage, terminal, or depot. The Superior Court relies on dictionary definitions to hold that the partially fenced lot, adjacent to (and not in) the shipping facility, did not fall within any of these terms. Finally, coverage would only apply if the cargo was in Genaeya’s custody, which it was not.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Paul Walker at 717-441-7061 (pwalker@tthlaw.com).
Mitchell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare), 2155 C.D. 2009, April 16, 2010
(PA Commonwealth Court unreported decision)
Background
Claimant, Mitchell, was injured in a work-related incident on September 9, 1998. She suffered a new injury on October 26, 1999. Thereafter, Claimant retired from employment at PA's Department of Public Welfare. Upon her retirement, Claimant was entitled to a pension benefit which Employer sought to credit against her weekly worker's compensation benefit payment. Historically, Claimant had also recovered a monetary settlement through a third-party for her second injury. Employer exercised its right to subrogation over a portion of this settlement fund. Claimant challenged Employer's positions.
Holding
The Commonwealth Court upheld Employer's position by, initially, holding that the Employer's right to subrogation was "absolute." Moreover, the Court held that after the Employer took subrogation, it was merely made whole. It was then, also, entitled to take a credit for Claimant's pension benefit, as a means to avoid paying duplicate benefits for the same injury (once it was established that Employer, in fact, funded the aforementioned pension).
Also notable in this Opinion was the Court's stern warning to counsel to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Apparently, Claimant's counsel failed, in numerous locations throughout Claimant's appellate submittals to comply with the Rules. These failures ranged from the absence of the standard of review applicable to the Court's inquiry to a deficient Statement of the Case. While the Court did not quash the appeal as a result of these omissions, it did find a number of Claimant's questions on appeal were waived for failure to argue same.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Ryan Blazure at 570-820-0240 ext. 8603 or
rblazure@tthlaw.com
MARYLAND CASE DIGESTS
Strub v. C & M Builders, LLC
Court of Special Appeals
Case No. 53
September Term, 2009
Opinion by Davis, J.
Filed: May 28, 2010
An Employer who Owes a Duty to Its Employees to Maintain a Safe Workplace Also Owes a Duty to Other Subcontractors Working on a Job Site
Background
C&M and Bayside Properties, Inc., the general contractor, orally contracted for C&M to finish framing the second and third floors of a row home. When C&M began working, the building consisted of exterior walls and a roof. The first floor was framed, but contained an opening for a basement staircase to be installed at a later date. Another subcontractor fell through that opening from the third floor. The subcontractor sued C&M for negligence. At trial, the court precluded the plaintiff from admitting testimony regarding C&M’s violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), and the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MOSHA”), which require employers to maintain a safe workplace for their employees. A jury found C&M not liable.
Holding
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court held that the trial court erred when it precluded all testimony regarding OSHA or MOSHA. Under MOSHA and OSHA, C&M owed a duty to its own employees to maintain a safe workplace against an unguarded hazard: the open stairwell. C&M thus owed a duty to the subcontractor as well, and testimony regarding the MOSHA and OSHA violations was admissible.
Prince George’s County, Maryland v. Brent
Court of Appeals
Case No. 71
September Term, 2009
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
Filed: May 17, 2010
An Unsatisfied Judgment Does not Preclude a Separate Subsequent Suit Against a Defendant Not Named in the Original Suit
Background
The plaintiff collided with a County police cruiser. The plaintiff sued the County and obtained a judgment for $200,000, which was the statutory limit. The County paid $20,000 to the plaintiff, which was its limit under its insurance policy. The plaintiff then sued the officer for $180,000. The jury found for the plaintiff.
Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against the individual officer. The Court held that the unsatisfied judgment against the County did not preclude the suit against the officer. The Court also held that the officer was not immune from suit on the theory that he was driving an emergency vehicle because the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that he was in emergency service.
Norman v. Borison
Court of Special Appeals
Case No. 54
September Term, 2009
Opinion by Wright, J.
Filed: May 7, 2010
Defamation of a Company Does Not Create a Cause of Action for Shareholders or Owners
Background
A company owned by the plaintiff was a defendant in civil litigation in the federal court. The plaintiff was contacted by the press about that litigation. Stories later appeared in newspapers about that litigation. Subsequently, in a separate state court action, the plaintiff sued the opposing parties and their lawyers for defamation because the circulated copies of pleadings to newspapers and throughout the internet. The trial court dismissed the suit.
Holding
The court affirmed the dismissal. In doing so, the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for defamation because the plaintiff was not individually identified in any defamatory statements. The court explained that defamation of a company does not create a cause of action for its shareholders or owners.