Ranalli v. Rohm and Haas Co.,

2009 PA Super 178

Decided September 8, 2009

 

The Superior Court reverses a trial court’s holding that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar an employee’s wrongful death action.

 

Background:  Olivia Ranalli died as a result of a brain tumor, which her husband claimed was caused by her exposure to vinyl chloride while working for Rohm and Haas. The husband brought a wrongful death claim against the employer. The employer filed preliminary objections, arguing that the suit was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court denied the preliminary objections, and the employer appealed.

 

Holding:  The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the employer’s preliminary objections. The wife’s last “exposure” to the employer’s work site occurred sixteen years prior to the diagnosis of the brain tumor. The husband argued that the Act’s exclusivity provision did not apply, and the employer was not immune from civil suit, because the Act expressly excludes from its definition of "injury" occupational diseases manifesting more than 300 weeks after last date of workplace exposure, and since the exclusivity provision does not bar a common law action against an employer for an injury which is non-compensable under the Act, the civil action is not barred; and the employer was fraudulent in not revealing studies that showed the dangers of vinyl chloride. The employer asserted that the Act provides the exclusive remedy, and that the defense of the statute of repose of 300 weeks is merely a trade-off made when granting recovery against an employer for allowing recovery for work-related injury without a showing of negligence. The Superior Court that the Act’s exclusivity provision barred recovery even though this was not a compensable injury under the Act. Essentially, the Superior Court opinion recognizes that there is no constitutional guarantee of recovery under the Act when in some cases the 300 week limitation will preclude recovery. 

 

Any questions regarding this case may be directed to Corey J. Adamson at 717-255-7639 or cadamson@tthlaw.com.

 

Weaver v. Harpster, et. al.

975 A.2d 555 (Pa. 2009)

 

 Plaintiff, Malissa Weaver, was employed as an administrative assistant and office manager for Harpster & Shipman Financial and Susquehanna Insurance Associates. She was one of less than four employees of these entities. Weaver alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment by her superiors, who would: proposition her, rub, touch, and hug her; comment on her appearance and sexual proclivities; and follow her around the office and to the bathroom. Weaver rejected these advances after which she contends her working conditions became intolerable and she was forced to resign. Thereafter, Weaver filed suit in state court alleging that she had been wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy against sex discrimination. The Snyder County Court of common Pleas dismissed her complaint, but the matter was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, who reversed and remanded this decision on final appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme court. The Court held that no claim for wrongful termination on the basis of sex discrimination existed against companies who employed less than four employees.

 

In examining plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination, the Court noted that, although Pennsylvania is an at-will employment state permitting termination of employees for any reason, some exceptions to this rule have been found where termination would clearly violate public policy considerations. However, in considering plaintiff’s public policy agreements, the Court noted that the Pennsylvania legislature had taken specific steps to address sex discrimination by enacting the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, which prohibited such discrimination. The Act, although suggestive of a public policy against discrimination, could not be used as a basis for the creation of that public policy in circumstances where the Act itself would not apply. Because the Act only applied where the employer had four or more employees (and the possibility that it could apply to every employer having been specifically debated and rejected in the Act) and the defendant employed less than that, plaintiff could not establish a wrongful termination based on a public policy against sex discrimination. This decision was consistent with prior decisions rejecting the public policy exception argument in cases where a Legislative Act could, but did not apply, such as the Whistleblower Act. The Court explained that it was within the discretion and duty of the legislature to extend the prohibition on sex discrimination to employers such as defendants, not the courts.

 

Moreover, to hold to the contrary, suggested the Court, would create a two-tiered system for addressing sex discrimination, where “large” employers would be required to submit to the administrative process, while “small” employers would go directly into litigation. This would not serve the legislative intent behind the Act to create an administrative body, with particular expertise, to receive, investigate, conciliate, hear, and decide these types of cases. Finally, a contrary decision could open up liability under numerous other statutes as “public policy exceptions” to the at-will rule despite the fact that certain employers are otherwise exempted explicitly from compliance.

 

Employees should be aware, however, that there is a bill which has been circulated recently in the legislature which would amend the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act to apply to all entities employing one or more employees.

Lanay Brown vs. Daniel Realty Co., et al.,

No. 77, September Term, 2008. 

Opinion filed 22 July 2008 by Harrell, J.

 

Civil procedure – evidence – depositions – civil trials – it was error for a trial court to allow the deposition of a former party/witness, who was the next friend of the minor Plaintiff, to be used a substantive evidence in the defense’s case-on-chief, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2), where the deposed person’s individual claims had been resolved against her before the court admitted her deposition testimony as evidence; however, the error was harmless under the circumstances because the prejudicial aspects of the deponent’s deposition testimony were already in play because the deposition had been used for impeachment purposes during the defense’s cross-examination of her at trial, without objection, when she testified during the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief.

 

Facts: In this lead paint case, Petitioner, Lanay Brown, through her aunt, Catherlina Queen, as her next friend, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the landlord of a property where she resided as a child from 1990 to 1994. Petitioner alleged that the landlord, Daniel Realty, negligently maintained the property and that, as a result, she suffered lead poisoning from ingesting lead paint flakes as an infant. Queen also sued the landlord in her individual capacity, seeking damages resulting from severe emotional distress and Petitioner’s medical expenses. Queen, testified that she raised Petitioner since Petitioner’s birth, and, when she and Petitioner moved into the property, the paint was in good condition. She stated that the paint started chipping about six months later. During cross examination, Daniel Realty impeached Queen with previous statements she made during a pre-trial deposition concerning who else lived at the property with her and Petitioner and whether Petitioner’s exposure to lead-based paint occurred at another residence. It also read into the record portions of Queen’s deposition.

 

Petitioner objection, but was overruled each time. During his closing argument, Daniel Realty’s counsel relied on the evidence to suggest that the paint at the subject property was not chipping or peeling while Petitioner lived there. The jury found that Petitioner failed to prove that the paint at the property was chipping or peeling and the trial judge accordingly entered judgment in favor of Daniel Realty.

 

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Brown vs. Daniel Realty Co., 180 Md. App. 102, 949 A.2d 6 (2008). The Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari to consider: (1) Whether the intermediate appellate court erred in holding that the Circuit Court properly allowed Daniel Realty to read into evidence portions of Queen’s deposition testimony?

           

Held:     Affirmed. The Court of Appeals considered whether Daniel Realty should have been permitted to read excerpts of Queen’s deposition into the record during its defense case. The Court looked to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2), the express relied on by the trial court to admit the deposition testimony. Rule 2-419(a)(2) provides that the deposition of a “party” may be used at trial, for any purpose, by an adverse party. Petitioner argued that Queen ceased to be a “party” when her individual claims were disposed of by the trial court following Petitioner’s case-in-chief and that Queen’s status as Petitioner’s next friend was not sufficient to qualify her as a “party” at the time Daniel Realty read her deposition testimony into the record as part of its case. The Court surveyed decisions by other state appellate courts interpreting rules similar to Rule 2-419(a)(2), agreeing with persuasively reasoned opinions of those courts recognizing that a person must be “party” at the time the opponent seeks to use the deposition, even if the deponent was a party when the deposition was taken. The Court then determined that Queen’s status as Petitioner’s next friend did not render her a party for purposes of Rule 2-419(a)(2), reasoning that an infant who, due to her age, may not prosecute or defend a cause, except through a next friend, should not have the next friend’s testimony imputed to her, if to do so effectively would penalize the infant for relying on the next friend. The Court, accordingly, resolved that the trial court’s decision, allowing Daniel Realty to read Queen’s deposition testimony into the record during its defense case was in error. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that reversal was not warranted because the error was harmless on this record.

 

Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund vs. Conchita Baxter, et al.,

No. 530, September Term, 2008,

Opinion filed June 9, 2009 by Salmon, J.

 

Insurance-coverage – an insurer is not required under Maryland law to provide uninsured motorist coverage to an uninsured stranger pedestrian who is struck by an automobile that would have been insured by the Defendant’s insurer if the vehicle had not been driven, at the time of the accident, by a driver excluded from coverage under the Defendant’s insurer’s policy.

 

Facts:     January 2007, Teresa Ann Palugi owned a 1998 Jeep Cherokee that was insured with Interstate Automobile Insurance Company (Interstate). Ms. Palugi agreed to exclude her husband, William Palugi, from coverage on the insurance policy because he lacked a valid driver’s license. The policy stated that when the covered vehicle was operated by an excluded driver, all coverage was excluded for the excluded driver, the vehicle owner, resident family members, and “any other person, except for Personal Injury Protection benefits and Uninsured Motorist coverage if such insurance is not available to that other person under another motor vehicle policy.”

 

On January 21, 2007, William Palugi was driving negligently when he struck and killed Stephanie Scott. Ms. Scott’s mother and her personal representative filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, asking the court to decide whether they were entitled to recovery under Interstate’s policy or from the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF), whose uninsured division is responsible for payment of claims (up to $20,000.00) by Maryland residents who are involved in motor vehicle accidents with uninsured motorists and who have no other source of recovery. Both Interstate and MAIF moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted Interstate’s motion and denied MAIF’s motion, finding that MAIF’s reliance on the exclusions and exceptions to exclusions in Interstate’s policy was misplaced because Ms. Scott was never an insured under the Interstate policy and therefore, could not be excluded.

 

Held:     Affirmed. On appeal, MAIF claimed that the terms of the Interstate policy conflict with provisions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Statute that addressed exclusions to coverage and exceptions to those exclusions. The Court agreed with the Circuit Court that MAIF’s reliance on these provisions was misplaced because Ms. Scott was not an insured as defined in Interstate’s policy and exceptions do not create coverage. MAIF claimed that Ms. Scott was an insured under Interstate’s policy because she was “occupying” the Jeep when it struck her. The policy defined “occupying” as “in, or upon, or entering into, or alighting from”. MAIF maintained that because Ms. Scott was struck by the Jeep, she was briefly upon it at the time of the accident. This argument was rejected because; Maryland case law requires that to be an occupant a claimant must have been performing an act normally associated with the immediate use of the vehicle when injury occurred. The Court held that a pedestrian who has had no connection with the insured vehicle, except for the fact of being struck by it, was not “upon” the vehicle and thus not “occupying” it as that term is used in Clause 2 of Interstate’s policy. Moreover, Ms. Scott did not qualify as a person who is required to be covered under the Maryland UM statute. Section 19-509(c)(1) of the Maryland Insurance Article requires insurers to provide UM coverage for damages that either an insured or a surviving relative is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle. The Court of Appeals has interpreted this section as requiring each policy to include coverage for that policy’s insured. This means that the Maryland UM statute only requires that UM coverage be provided to persons who are insured under the policy, not third parties like Ms. Scott.

 

Michael Blackburn, et al. vs. Erie Insurance Group,

No. 0210, September Term, 2008,

Opinion filed May 11, 2009 by Salmon, J.

 

Insurance – uninsured motorist insurance: Md. Code (2006 Repl. Vol.), Insurance Article §19-513(e) allows an insurer to calculate the benefits payable under an uninsured/underinsured policy by deducting monies paid to the insured by a Workers’ Compensation carrier, not merely the amount repaid by the insured that was necessary to satisfy the Workers’ Compensation lien.

 

Facts:     Blackburn, a federal employee, was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of Quin. Blackburn filed a workers’ compensation claim with the U.S. government, which asserted a lien against him in the amount of $246,305.66. Blackburn’s insurance policy with Erie Insurance Exchange provided uninsured motorist (UM) benefits of up to $250,000 per person. Quin’s State Farm policy provided liability coverage of up to $100,000 per person. Blackburn accepted $100,000 from State Farm and then paid the U.S. government $27,396.28 towards the workers’ compensation lien. The government closed its lien as satisfied. Blackburn demanded payment from Erie of his UM benefit, which he claimed was $150,000 after the $250,000 limit had been reduced by the $100,000 he had accepted from State Farm. Erie refused to pay this amount, contending that under Maryland Insurance Article § 19-513(e), Erie was entitled to reduce its payment by the amount Blackburn received for his workers’ compensation claim, less the monies Blackburn had repaid the U.S. government. Both parties moved for summary judgment in the Circuit court for Frederick County. The Circuit court found that Blackburn’s satisfaction of the lien was not synonymous with reimbursement to the U.S. government because to hold otherwise would result in duplication of benefits to Blackburn. The court therefore accepted Erie’s construction of the statute.

 

Held:     Affirmed. Blackburn argued that when the U.S. government received $27,396.28 from him and marked its workers’ compensation lien as satisfied, the government voluntarily agreed to accept this lower amount as reimbursement for the $246,305.66 it had paid in compensation benefits. Therefore, according to Blackburn, the government had been fully reimbursed, and Erie still owed Blackburn $150,000 (the $250,000 UM benefits minus the $100,000 State Farm payment). Erie contended on appeal that the proper calculation would be to subtract from $150,000.00, the net amount Blackburn had recovered from the government, which was $218,909.38 ($248,305.66 {the workers’ compensation payment} minus $27,396.28 {the amount Blackburn repaid the government}) leaving a negative balance of $68,909.38. Section 19-513(e) states that UM and personal injury benefits (PIP) benefits “shall be reduced to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under the workers’ compensation laws of a state or the federal government for which the provider of the workers’ compensation benefits has not been reimbursed.” The majority pointed out, citing State Farm Mut. Auto Insurance Company vs. Ins. Comm’r, 283 Md. 663 (1978) that the word “recover” as used in §19-513(e) means “to get,” “to obtain,” “to come into possession of,” “to receive,” and that the purpose of §19-513(e) is to allow UM and PIP carriers to deduct the monies received from the compensation carrier that the insured had not already paid back. Here, Blackburn recovered $246,305.26 in workers’ compensation benefits, while his employer was reimbursed for only $27,396.28 of this sum. The court went on to stress that the word “reimbursement” is commonly defined and understood to mean “repayment.” Although the federal government chose to consider its lien satisfied, the government was not repaid $218,908.98 of the sum it paid to Blackburn. The majority thus concluded that the government had not been fully reimbursed. One judge dissented, opinion that the majority opinion misconstrued the legislature’s intent insofar as it concerned the workers’ compensation offset and thus deprived Blackburn of the UM coverage for which he had paid premiums. In the dissents view, the purpose of UM insurance is to place the accident victim in the same position he would occupy if the uninsured tortfeasor had maintained liability coverage equal to the limits of coverage under the victim’s own UM policy. This being so, Blackburn was entitled to be placed in as good a financial position as he would have enjoyed if Quin had maintained liability insurance with $250,000.00 limit per person. Had Quin maintained such a limit, Blackburn would have received a $256,000.00 UM benefit from State Farm, as well as the $236,305.66 from the government, minus the $27,396.28 he repaid the government, for a net recovery of $468,909.38. The majority opinion deprived him of $150,000, which constituted a windfall to Erie.