Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers
570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009).
Private cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments
In this case, the decedent was a resident of a County-operated skilled nursing home facility. Plaintiff alleged that the center failed to provide proper care for the decedent and as a result she died. It was alleged that the defendant failed to meet duties imposed by the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments. Although the trial court dismissed the Complaint and held that the Act did not convey any rights, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in a 2-1 decision. The Third Circuit concluded that the language of the Amendments was sufficient to create rights and declared that “[t]he statutes at issue in this case do not expressly authorize private causes of action to enforce their provisions and the parties do not dispute this. Federal laws that do not explicitly authorize private causes of action may do so implicitly. Furthermore, actions for violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are ‘presumptively available’ against individuals acting under color of state law.”
Senior District Judge Stafford of the Northern District of Florida filed a vigorous dissent to the majority opinion in which he declared that he did “not agree that Congress intended to confer upon nursing home residents the right to invoke
section 1983 to sue individual nursing homes for alleged violations of the non-monetary service requirements set forth in section 1396r.”
This decision is significant in Pennsylvania since county-owned nursing homes are immune from medical malpractice claims under Pennsylvania law. A Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is anticipated to be filed.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Dave Schwalm at 717‑255‑7643 or
dschwalm@tthlaw.com.
O’Hara v. First Liberty Insurance Corp.
2009 Pa. Super. 214
Decided: November 9, 2009
Superior Court upholds forum selection clause in an insurance policy where the policy contained a clear provision requiring suit to be filed in the county and state of the insureds’ legal domicile at the time of the accident.
Background: On March 29, 2007, Diane O’Hara was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist in Delaware County. At the time of the accident, Mrs. O’Hara and her husband were residents of Delaware County and were insured under an automobile policy issued by First Liberty Insurance Corp. The policy contained a clause mandating that, if suit were brought by one of its insureds against First Liberty, then the venue had to be in a court of competent jurisdiction, in the county and state of the insureds’ legal domicile, as of the date of the accident.
After Mr. and Mrs. O’Hara collected the full limit of the tortfeasor’s liability coverage, they presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to First Liberty. First Liberty denied the claim, and they brought suit for breach of contract in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. First Liberty then filed preliminary objections to the chosen venue, based upon the policy’s forum selection clause. The O’Hara’s responded by arguing that Pa.R.C.P. 2179 establishes that venue in an action against an insurance company is proper in any county where the insurer regularly conducts business and, accordingly, a clause in an insurance policy limiting venue is contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and void.
Holding: The Superior Court held that unambiguous forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and will only be deemed unenforceable where: 1) the clause itself was induced by fraud or overreaching; 2) the forum selected in the clause is so unfair or inconvenient that a party, for all practical purposes, will be deprived of an opportunity to be heard; or 3) the clause is found to violate public policy. As none of the limitations on such clauses applied, and because there was compelling precedent supporting the enforceability of this type of clause, the transfer of the case to Delaware County was upheld.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Kevin McNamara at 717-237-7132 or kmcnamara@tthlaw.com.
Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services
577 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2009)
Children & Youth caseworkers found not entitled to absolute immunity in civil rights claims
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court and held that while the Defendant caseworkers were not entitled to absolute immunity when investigating or administering cases, they were entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of the case.
Background: Children & Youth Services removed children from the home of their mother and stepfather to investigate claims of alleged sexual abuse on Friday, January 10. Three days later, on Monday, January 13, the solicitor was advised of this incident. The following day, the solicitor filed a petition to have the children placed in protective custody. A hearing was then scheduled for January 16. That hearing was continued until February 20, with the agreement of the parents. In the meantime, Children & Youth determined that the abuse claim was unfounded, and the Court returned the children to the parents’ custody at the February 20 hearing.
Plaintiffs filed suit and claimed that their procedural due process rights were violated since the post-deprivation hearing did not take place until more than 72 hours after the children were removed from the home. The Third Circuit concluded that while Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to this hearing within 72 hours, and the right was clearly established at the time of the incident, it was objectively reasonable for the Defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate this right. In fact, the Court held that since the children were taken into custody at the end of the day on Friday, and that information was provided to the solicitor on Monday morning, the caseworkers could believe that there was sufficient time within which to file a petition and for a hearing to be held within the 72 hour time period. Since there was no indication that the caseworkers were responsible for the delay, they were entitled to qualified immunity.
With respect to the claim for absolute immunity for caseworkers, the Court explained that caseworkers were "entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in petitioning and in formulating and making recommendations to the state court because those actions are analogous to functions performed by state prosecutors, who were immune from suit at common law." Nevertheless that absolute immunity did not extend to 'investigative or administrative' actions taken by child welfare workers outside the context of a judicial proceeding."
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Dave Schwalm at 717‑255‑7643 or
dschwalm@tthlaw.com.
Braun v. Target Corporation
2009 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4252
Decided October 23, 2009
The Superior Court held that in a negligence claim, evidence that the injured Plaintiff had been consuming alcohol is admissible, so long as there is corroborating evidence that the Plaintiff was intoxicated.
Background: John Braun was employed as a connector of steel roofing joists, during the construction of a Target store, working on the rail platform of a scissor lift, 18 feet above the ground. During his lunch break, Braun consumed an undetermined amount of beer and then returned to work. While on the elevated scissor lift, he failed to secure himself to the anchorage and unnecessarily left the railed platform, stepping out onto an 8 inch wide steel beam from which he subsequently fell and was injured. At trial, judgment was entered in favor of the Defendants and Plaintiff appealed arguing that in the absence of eyewitness testimony that Plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated, evidence that he had consumed alcohol should not have been admitted.
Holding: The Superior Court held that the evidence of Braun’s consumption of alcohol was properly admitted, because there was sufficient additional evidence that Braun was intoxicated, including his testimony that he had consumed alcohol throughout the day of the accident, his failure to use safety equipment, his inexplicable exit from the platform onto a narrow steel beam and expert testimony that his BAC level rendered him impaired.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Gordon Einhorn at 717‑441‑7054 or geinhorn@tthlaw.com.
In re Estate of John E. DuPont
No. 181 MAL 2009
November 5, 2009
The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Superior Court ruling which upheld the sealing of records from DuPont’s incapacity hearing. The underlying case involves the DuPont heir who killed a wrestling athlete that he sponsored. Mark DeHaven, another wrestler sponsored by DuPont, claims that DuPont told him that he would never have to worry about health benefits or retirement. DeHaven sought to have the record unsealed to determine whether there was any evidence of a trust on his behalf.
The lower courts denied his request, which request was based on a common law right to access judicial proceedings and records. The courts distinguished trial records from incapacity hearings which by statute, 20 Pa.C.S.A. §5511(a), may be closed to the public. Further, the Superior Court determined that the standard to unseal a record is “good cause”, with the burden on the petitioner. The trial court offered the less intrusive solution of an in camera review that was rejected by DeHaven.
The narrow question for review is whether the burden of proof is on the party requesting modification of an order sealing records or on the party opposing the unsealing of records.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Kathryn A. Willliams at 610-332-7029 or kwilliams@tthlaw.com.
Lohman v Duryea Borough
574 F.3d 163 (3rd Cir. 2009)
The Third Circuit holds that evidence of settlement negotiations, whether informal or formal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 68 “Offers of Judgment”, may be considered when a party makes an application for counsel fees. Consideration of settlement negotiations does not violate Rule 408.
Background:
Nicholas Lohman obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $12,500 on a wrongful discharge action. During the trial, Duryea Borough made a settlement offer of $75,000. At the conclusion of the trial, Lohman moved for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $112,883.73. The district court awarded $30,000 in attorney’s fees and $4,251.77 in costs.
Holding:
The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that FRE 408 prohibits consideration of settlement negotiations with regard to the “validity” of a claim, but does not prohibit consideration of settlement negotiations with regard to the “objective reasonableness” of a claim. The most critical factor in determining a reasonable fee is consideration of the degree of success obtained by plaintiff’s counsel. Evidence of settlement negotiations can be relevant in comparing “what a plaintiff requested to what the plaintiff was ultimately awarded.”
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Dave Schwalm at 717‑255‑7643 or
dschwalm@tthlaw.com.
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2009)
Background: Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserted various constitutional claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on many of the claims. Although Plaintiff received $150,000 in damages on a false arrest claim, the jury found for the Defendants on all other claims.
Holding: Plaintiff’s counsel sought fees of $181,340. The trial court reduced the fees to $27,178, excluding the work performed on unsuccessful claims. Because the unsuccessful claims were not dependent on the same set of facts and legal theories as the successful claims, the trial court determined that the fees could be segregated and excluded. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Dave Schwalm at 717‑255‑7643 or
dschwalm@tthlaw.com.
Parker v. Conway
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20723, (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2009)
Third Circuit holds that the cap on attorney’s fees set forth in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e, was not unconstitutional and did not deny prisoners equal protection.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, attorney’s fees are limited to 150 % of the total judgment. Although the attorneys for Plaintiff sought fees in the amount of $64,089, the Court limited the award to $26,250. The Third Circuit affirmed this decision and held that a rational basis existed for limiting such fees, including the intent of deterring frivolous lawsuits.
“For example, the PLRA fee caps rationally relate to the legitimate goal of reducing (in addition to uniformizing) attorney's fee awards. Congress could have rationally believed that attorney's fee awards in general are too high. The fee caps tend to reduce those fee awards. Again, it is not constitutionally problematic that Congress chose to single out prisoners in attempting to further this legitimate government objective.
In addition, the fee caps rationally relate to the legitimate government objective of deterring frivolous lawsuits and deterring lawsuits that, while not technically frivolous, generate litigation costs that exceed any potential recovery.” Citations omitted.
Any questions regarding these cases can be directed to Dave Schwalm at 717‑255‑7643 or
dschwalm@tthlaw.com.
Lohman v Duryea Borough
574 F.3d 163 (3rd Cir. 2009)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that evidence of settlement negotiations, whether informal or formal pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 68 Offers of Judgment, may be considered when a party makes an application for counsel fees. Consideration of settlement negotiations does not violate FRE 408.
Background:
In Lohman, Nicholas Lohman obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $12,500 on a wrongful discharge action. During the trial, Duryea Borough made a settlement offer of $75,000. At the conclusion of the trial, Lohman moved for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $112,883.73. The district court awarded $30,000 in attorney’s fees and $4,251.77 in costs.
Holding:
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that FRE 408 prohibits consideration of settlement negotiations with regard to the “validity” of a claim, but does not prohibit consideration of settlement negotiations with regard to the “objective reasonableness” of a claim. The most critical factor in determining a reasonable fee is consideration of the degree of success obtained by plaintiff’s counsel. Evidence of settlement negotiations can be relevant in comparing “what a plaintiff requested to what the plaintiff was ultimately awarded.”
The effect of this ruling is that plaintiff’s attorneys will need to take care in evaluating the value of their client’s claim and to negotiate accordingly, rather than merely taking a shot before a jury.
Any questions on this case can be directed to Winifred E. Bellon at 610.332.7017 or wbellon@tthlaw.com or David L. Schwalm
at 717.255.7643 or dschwalm@tthlaw.com.