Rev. Mundie v. Christ United Church of Christ

2009 Pa Super 262

Decided: December 31, 2009

 

The Superior Court holds that a civil court may have subject matter jurisdiction of a pastor’s breach of contract claim for termination of employment, as long as the proof of such claim does not invade matters of doctrine. Although a church has the right to hire and fire pastors without civil court review, only monetary damages for breach of contract are sought, not reinstatement. 

 

Background:  A pastor, employed by a church, was due to retire and receive a monetary retirement package. Prior to retirement, other members of the congregation took control of the church council and terminated the pastor. The pastor filed a two-count complaint sounding in breach of contract and bad faith. The church filed preliminary objections claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The church argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as the dispute was ecclesiastical in nature. A hearing took place, where the pastor testified that the removal was financially motivated, and other congregational members testified that the pastor had been damaging the spiritual welfare of the church, causing a membership decline. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections. The pastor appealed.

 

Holding:  On appeal, the Superior Court reverses and remands the case. The court notes that it must view the allegations of the Complaint as true, and the Complaint alleged the existence of a written employment contract, subject to change only by unanimous consent. The pastor and the church council unanimously agreed as to retirement and a retirement package. A church is free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, which are enforceable in civil courts. Enforcement of such contracts does not infringe on a church’s right to select or terminate its pastors. The First Amendment protects a church’s right to hire, fire, promote and assign duties to ministers because judicial review of these particular actions could interfere with protected rights. However, all disputes among church members are not doctrinal in nature. Some are simply contractual disputes which are questions of civil law and not religious doctrine. The questions of what the parties agreed to, or whether there was an agreement at all, are not doctrinal and can be resolved without intruding into sacred precincts. The trial court went too far in deference to the church decision to terminate the pastor. The case initially only turns on the question of whether a contract existed, and the Complaint only seeks monetary damages. The pastor should be allowed on remand the opportunity to prove that excessive entanglement into church matters need not occur to prove the breach of contract claim. If the facts prove otherwise, however, summary judgment may be granted in favor of the church.      

 

Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Paul Walker at 717-441-7061 (pwalker@tthlaw.com).

 

 

Simon v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.,

2009 Pa. Super. 263

Decided: December 31, 2009

 

The Superior Court reverses the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s application of the “discovery rule” to toll the statue of limitations. The evidence was sufficient to find that drug manufacturer did not provide adequate warnings to physicians of breast cancer risks.

 

Background: Starting in 1992, Plaintiff took hormone replacement prescription medication to relieve the symptoms of menopause and later developed invasive breast cancer. Plaintiff alleged the package insert did not warn of the risk of developing cancer in humans. She did not learn of the connection between the medication and the risk of cancer until a study was released confirming the link between hormone replacement therapy and breast cancer. Suit was filed within two years of the release of the data, but several years had elapsed since she was diagnosed with breast cancer. At trial, the jury applied the discovery rule and found the lawsuit was timely. Further, the jury determined that causation was demonstrated with sufficient evidence to conclude that the drug manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

 

Holding: The Superior Court reversed the trial court grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Although she took the medication and was diagnosed with cancer a decade before the landmark study was released, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that a reasonable patient could not ascertain the connection between combination hormone replacement therapy and the increased risk of breast cancer under the circumstances. Package inserts did not advise of the increased incidence in humans. Manufacturers had not advised physicians of the increased risk of breast cancer from the therapy. 

 

Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Kathryn Williams at 610-332-7029 (kwilliams@tthlaw.com)

 

 

Clark, et al., v Pfizer, et al., 754 EDA 2009

2010 Pa.Super. 6

Decided: January 19, 2010

 

Superior Court affirms Order to de-certify a Class, concluding that the commonality and typicality requirements cannot be satisfied. The Order granting Summary Judgment against the Class and/or their claims is vacated, concluding that potential res judicata effect on the Action Class Members could bar their causes of action.

 

Background:  Appellants, a purported class, brought a class-action suit against the makers of Neurontin (generic - Gabapentin), Pfizer and Warner-Lambert,  for their alleged promotion of “off-label” uses of the drug, uses not specifically approved by the Federal Food and Drug Administration.  Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants engaged in a activities designed to advertise these “off-uses”, which included treatment for psychiatric disorders, pain syndromes, RSD, restless leg syndrome and fibromyalgia, whereas the drug had only been approved for the treatment of partial seizures and post-herpetic neuralgia, and that their doctors had relied upon these advertisements in prescribing Neurontin.  The trial court (1) de-certified the class as the Plaintiffs could not establish that the prescribing doctors relied upon a false advertisement generated by the Defendants; and (2) granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and against all members of the class “who actually benefitted from off label uses of Neurontin”.

 

Holding:  Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Court affirmed the de-certification of the class as the Plaintiffs relied, in essence, upon a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, so-called since the Plaintiffs’ expert did not actually indicate which prescribing doctors had relied upon (or even seen) the Defendants alleged misrepresentations.  Rather, they cited to a nationwide study which was argued to have “likely resulted in impact and harm to the Pennsylvania class”.  Further, the Court noted that the “fraud-on-the-market” theory applies in litigation involving securities or product-price inflation.  The Court reversed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants due to the potential res judicata (issue-precluding) effect on the absent class members’ causes of action.  The Court reasoned that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was untenable, because the trial court had ruled the class action unsustainable under the law.

  

Questions pertaining to this case can be directed to Ryan C. Blazure at (610) 332-7030 or  rblazure@tthlaw.com

The Appellate Division for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision dismissing a personal injury claim against the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) for Plaintiff’s failure to provide a sum certain as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

 

Background:  Plaintiff was the driver involved in a motor vehicle accident with a USPS vehicle driven by its employee in the scope of his employment. Less than one month after the accident, Plaintiff’s counsel provided formal notice to USPS, via a letter, of Plaintiff’s intent to pursue a claim against it and did not provide a sum certain claim for damages. The USPS timely responded by providing a letter outlining the administrative requirements under the FTCA. In response, Plaintiff provided a letter stating that she was still in treatment and would provide a sum certain when treatment was completed.

 

Discussion:  The FTCA provides “exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States…for injury or loss of property, or personal injury…caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while working within the scope of his…employment.” 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1). The FTCA also provides the following: (1) an action cannot be instituted against the United States for money damages without first presenting the claim to the appropriate Federal agency; and (2) an action against the Government cannot be for a sum in excess of the amount presented to the Federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a) and (b). Relative to these requirements of the FTCA, the Department of Justice has a procedural regulation that requires any claim presented to a Federal agency to provide written notification of the claim with “a claim for money damages in a sum certain for…personal injury…” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). Plaintiff’s failure to present a “sum certain” resulted in Plaintiff’s failure to properly present a claim to the Federal agency, despite the USPS’ correspondence providing the necessary form and statutory and regulatory provisions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed.

 

Holding:  Affirmed. A sum certain must be provided. Where a Plaintiff continues treatment, Plaintiff can request an estimate from her physician based on the physician’s recommended additional procedure. The estimate can be provided and amended as necessary to fulfill the requirements of the FTCA.

 

Questions pertaining to this case can be directed to Winifred E. Bellon at (610) 332-7017 or wbellon@tthlaw.com.