PENNSYLVANIA - CASE SUMMARIES
Supreme Court Cases
VAN IS AN ORTHOPEDIC APPLIANCE FOR QUADRIPLEGIC AND INSURER OBLIGATED TO PAY ENTIRE COST OF VAN’S PURCHASE WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO 80% CAP.
The claimant in Griffiths v. W.C.A.B. (Seven Stars Farm, Inc.), No. 148 MAP 2005, was rendered a quadriplegic by a work injury so he was wheelchair bound. Initially, the claimant’s wife rented a van to take the claimant to/from his medical appointments and later the claimant and his wife purchased a van. The insurer paid 80% of the rental costs and 80% of other costs that were not calculated under Medicare. When the van was purchased, the insurer paid to have the van retrofitted to accommodate the claimant’s wheelchair. The claimant filed a Penalty Petition seeking reimbursement for the entire cost of the purchase price of the van and also reimbursement for 100% of the other costs, including 100% of the cost of the van rental.
The WCJ granted the Penalty Petition in all respects and the Appeal Board affirmed the WCJ as to the finding that the insurer was responsible for 100% of the costs—not 80%. The Appeal Board reversed as to the finding that the insurer was required to pay for the van itself and not just the retrofitting.
Commonwealth Court held that the insurer was not responsible for payment of the van and Commonwealth Court also held that the insurer was only responsible for 80% of the other costs that were not calculated under Medicare.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first noted that Section 306(f.1)(1)(ii) of the Act suggests that an insurer must pay for, among other things, “orthopedic appliances”. The Court then held that under some circumstances, a van can be considered an orthopedic appliance. In so holding, the Court observed that it was the work accident itself that reduced the claimant’s mobility and the van remedied some of that lack of mobility.
However, the Court did indicate that while the Act was remedial in nature, the Act does not allow for a windfall. The Court suggested that there is nothing in the Act requiring that the van be new and the Court held that the claimant’s prior lifestyle and resources may be relevant in determining the appropriate expense for the van. The Court indicated that a claimant that previously owned a van would be in a different position than a claimant that did not, as would a claimant who had previously taken public transportation to get around. The Court even suggested that a claimant’s current vehicle might be traded-in to offset the cost of a van. Thus, the insurer had to pay for the van, and the retrofitting of the van, but the claimant did not have carte blanche to purchase any van that he wanted and the Court suggested that some of the cost of the van could be deferred by a trade-in.
As for the cost containment issue, the Court noted Section 306(f.1)(d)(i) indicates that a “provider” shall not request payment in excess of 113% of the applicable fee schedule set by Medicare. The Court also noted that Section 306(f.1)(d)(i) indicates that when the applicable fee schedule has not been calculated by Medicare, then the provider shall not request payment in excess of 80% of what most providers would charge.
The Court then held that because an auto dealer and the van rental agency did not provide “health care services”, they were not subject to an 80% cap and the insurer would be required to pay for 100% of all relevant costs and the claimant was entitled to reimbursement of 100% of the van rental costs.
CLAIMANT COULD RECOVER BENEFITS UNDER FEDERAL LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT AND PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT.
In McElheney v. W.C.A.B. (Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard), No. 15 EAP 2007, the Supreme Court was asked to address a single issue—when is an injured worker entitled to concurrent compensation under both the Federal Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA) and the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.
The claimant began receiving benefits under the LHWCA, which provides compensation to maritime workers for injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States. The payments ceased when the insurance carrier determined that claimant had sufficiently recovered and was able to return to work. The claimant then applied for benefits under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.
In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court noted that its focus would be on the construction of certain phrases in the LHWCA, specifically, whether the claimant was injured while performing a “traditional maritime function” and whether the location of the injury was “upon the navigable waters of the United States.”
The facts of the case demonstrated that the claimant was employed as a pipe fitter/welder and sustained injuries while working on a ship in a “graven dry dock”. A graven dry dock is a basin that is closed off from the water by a movable barrier, pumped dry, allowing the ship to settle down on blocks on the dry dock floor. Once the repairs are completed, the dry dock is then flooded.
Before the Pennsylvania WCJ, the insurer argued that the LHWCA preempted a Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation claim thereby precluding the application of Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Law. The WCJ agreed and the claim was dismissed. The Appeal Board affirmed.
Commonwealth Court disagreed, holding that the LHWCA supplemented, rather than supplanted state workers’ compensation law. Commonwealth Court held that there was concurrent jurisdiction for land based injuries to workers performing traditionally maritime functions when the injuries occurred within the landward extension of the LHWCA. Ultimately, Commonwealth Court concluded that there was concurrent recovery available to Mr. McElheney, because he was injured on a ship, that was not afloat, that was “on land”.
The Supreme Court affirmed Commonwealth Court. The Supreme Court agreed that the claimant was injured while engaged in a traditionally maritime function, i.e. a pipe fitter/welder working on a ship, so the question then was whether or not a graven dry dock was within the navigable waters of the United States, and thus was within the exclusive purview of the LHWCA, or whether the graven dry dock was land-based and within the judicially recognized zone of concurrent state and federal workers’ compensation jurisdiction.
In affirming Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court noted that the claimant was working aboard a vessel in dry dock and that this graven dry dock was a land-based site which was within the scope of LHWCA, which covers injuries upon the navigable waters of the United States, as well as any adjoining pier or other adjoining area customarily used for loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel. The Court then acknowledged a U.S. Supreme Court case, Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, et. al., 447 U.S. 715 (1980), which held that a dry dock was an area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a vessel. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then held that even though the dry dock was periodically flooded, this did not mean that the dock was on the “navigable waters of the U.S.” which would have meant that the LHWCA provided the exclusive relief.
Thus, the claimant was allowed to go forward with his claim under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act even though he had also received benefits under the LHWCA.
Commonwealth Court Cases
RECORDS TIMELY PROVIDED TO URO IF MAILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF REQUEST.
In Sueta v. W.C.A.B. (City of Scranton and PMA Group), No. 1905 C.D. 2007, the WCJ dismissed the claimant’s Petition for Review of a Utilization Review (UR) Determination for lack of jurisdiction due to the medical provider’s failure to supply medical records to the Utilization Review Organization (URO) within 30 days after the URO requested the records. In so doing, the WCJ relied upon Commonwealth Court’s Opinion in County of Allegheny v. W.C.A.B. (Geisler), 875 A.2d 1222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
As for the facts of the matter, the City of Scranton filed a UR request as to the treatments of Dr. Stolack and on August 3, 2005 the URO sent a letter to Dr. Stolack requesting that the doctor provide all records. It was undisputed that on September 2, 2005 Dr. Stolack mailed his records to the URO. It was also undisputed that the URO received the records on September 14, 2005.
In dismissing the claimant’s Petition for Review, the WCJ found that while Dr. Stolack’s records were mailed on September 2, 2005 Dr. Stolack’s office used its own postage meter so the date from this private postage meter was not legally sufficient to prove that the records were actually mailed on September 2, 2005. The WCJ concluded that Dr. Stolack failed to prove that his records were mailed within 30 days after the URO requested them. The Appeal Board affirmed.
Commonwealth Court reversed, noting that 34 Pa. Code Section 127.464, holds that, “If the provider under review fails to mail records to the URO within 30 days after the date of the request of the records, the URO shall render a determination that the treatment under review was not reasonable or necessary . . . .” The Court held that Section 127.464 only requires that the records be mailed without mentioning anything about when they were received. The Court concluded that because there was no dispute that Dr. Stolack mailed his records on September 2, 2005 this was sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of Section 127.464, i.e. that the records were mailed within 30 days of the date that they were requested to be mailed. The Court ordered that Dr. Stolack’s records be sent to a URO for a determination on the merits as to whether or not the treatments under review were reasonable and necessary.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED AS NOT BEING FILED WITHIN 500 WEEKS OF DATE OF SUSPENSION OF BENEFITS.
The issue in Romanowski v. W.C.A.B. (Precision Coil Processing), No. 1174 C.D. 2007, was whether the claimant could file a petition seeking specific loss benefits when the petition was filed more than 500 weeks after the claimant’s benefits were suspended.
The claimant injured his right foot/ankle in 1978. In June of 1994 the parties executed a supplemental agreement suspending claimant’s benefits effective January 21, 1993. The 500 week period following the suspension of benefits ceased in July of 2002. However, in October of 2004 claimant filed a petition seeking benefits for a loss of use of his right foot. The WCJ denied the petition because it had not been filed during the 500 weeks that partial disability benefits were payable under Section 413(a) of the Act. However, the WCJ did note that he believed that the claimant’s AWW was incorrect and the WCJ suggested that if records were available, then maybe claimant’s AWW could be changed. (In spite of this language in the Decision, the WCJ did not alter the AWW). The Appeal Board affirmed the dismissal of the claimant’s Petition.
Before Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that his petition was not time barred, based on his argument that Section 413(a) of the Act indicates that a WCJ may, at any time review, modify or set aside a Supplemental Agreement which meant that his Petition for Review could be filed at any time. The Court rejected this argument by holding that Section 413(a) of the Act is clear that a petition addressing a Supplemental Agreement must be filed within 3 years of the date of the most recent payment of compensation and when compensation has been suspended, payments may only be resumed during the period that partial disability benefits are payable, i.e. 500 weeks. Since the claimant’s petition was filed more than 500 weeks after his benefits were suspended, it was not timely.
CLAIMANT RECEIVING DISABILITY PENSION MIGHT BE ENTITLED TO ONGOING BENEFITS IF CLAIMANT PROVES STILL LOOKING FOR WORK.
The claimant’s benefits in Mason v. W.C.A.B. (Joy Mining Machinery & AIG Claims), No. 1906 C.D. 2007, were suspended in March of 2000 due to a return to work. In August of 2002 the claimant stopped working due to work-related surgeries and his benefits were reinstated. Post-surgery, the claimant was released to return to modified duty. The employer did not offer him modified duty, so the claimant applied for, and was granted, a disability pension from the employer.
Even before he applied for the disability pension, the employer had the claimant meet with a vocational expert. After this meeting, the vocational expert notified the claimant of potential job openings. The claimant’s follow up with respect to these positions was less than stellar. However, the claimant did look for work on his own.
The employer filed a Suspension/Modification Petition on the basis that work was available to the claimant but for the fact that he removed himself from the work force. The WCJ granted a modification of benefits, but refused to grant a suspension—rejecting the employer’s argument that the claimant abandoned the workforce by retiring. In rejecting this argument, the WCJ found that the claimant only filed for the disability pension after the employer refused to allow him to return to work.
The Appeal Board reversed as to the suspension, holding that when it was found that the claimant failed to follow through on the job referrals in good faith, the claimant then had the burden of showing that he had not voluntarily removed himself from the work force by accepting a disability pension. The Appeal Board held that under the circumstances, the claimant had removed himself from the entire work force so the Appeal Board suspended benefits.
In assessing the issue, Commonwealth Court noted that under SEPTA v. W.C.A.B. (Henderson), 669 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1995), by voluntarily accepting a pension, a claimant is presumed to have left the entire workforce unless the claimant can show that he/she is seeking employment or that he/she was forced to retire due to the work injury. The Court held that to prove the latter, the claimant had to prove that he/she was incapable of working at any job in the entire labor market, not just that the claimant was incapable of working at the time-of-injury position.
The Mason Court remanded the matter to the WCJ for further findings as to whether or not the claimant was, in good faith, looking for work on his own after he had accepted a disability pension from his employer as the Court did not believe this issue was properly explored by the WCJ.
NO REIMBURSEMENT FROM SUPERSEDEAS FUND WHEN REQUEST FOR SUSPENSION FILED BASED ON CLAIMANT’S FAILURE TO PURSUE REASONABLE MEDICAL CARE.
In the case of Land-O-Lakes, Inc., Crawford and Company and Old Republic Insurance Company v. W.C.A.B. (Todd) No. 1085 C.D. 2007, the insurer’s request for reimbursement from the Supersedeas Fund was denied.
The claimant suffered a work injury in June of 2003. In June of 2004 the insurer filed a Suspension Petition alleging that the claimant had refused reasonable medical treatment. The insurer’s request for supersedeas was denied so the insurer continued paying compensation. The WCJ eventually granted the Suspension Petition, finding that the claimant refused reasonable medical services.
The insurer filed an Application for Supersedeas Fund Reimbursement seeking repayment of more than $35,000.00 it paid during the pendency of its Suspension Petition. The Fund refused the insurer’s request and a WCJ likewise refused to order reimbursement. The Appeal Board affirmed.
In reviewing the issue, Commonwealth Court noted that Section 443(a) of the Act allows for reimbursement from the Supersedeas Fund if an insurer meets certain specific requirements, including the fact that the request for supersedeas was made pursuant to a petition filed under Section 413 of the Act or Section 430 of the Act. (Section 413 involves a request for supersedeas made with the filing of a petition for termination/modification/suspension and Section 430 involves a request for supersedeas filed in conjunction with an appeal).
The court then looked to its decision in Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Workers Compensation v. W.C.A.B. (Excel Logistics), 890 A.2d 1045 (Pa. 2005), which stands for the proposition that an insurer is not entitled to reimbursement from the Supersedeas Fund for benefits paid when it has filed a request for suspension of benefits due to a claimant’s failure to seek reasonable medical care. The Court suggested that Excel Logistics, correctly held that a Suspension Petition filed based on the refusal of reasonable medical services is not a Petition filed under Section 413 of the Act or 430 of the Act.
However, the insurer in Land-O-Lakes, argued that the decision in Excel Logistics, could not be retroactively applied to its situation in that its Suspension Petition was pending before the Court issued the decision in Excel Logistics. The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument, holding that in Excel Logistics, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was merely interpreting Section 443(a) of the Act and Commonwealth Court also noted that changes that occur in decisional law during litigation, are applied to those cases pending on appeal.
Thus, the insurer’s request for reimbursement from the Supersedeas Fund was denied.
INSURER SEEKING MODIFICATION/SUSPENSION BASED ON LABOR MARKET SURVEY MUST PROVE NO WORK AVAILABLE WITH TIME-OF-WORK EMPLOYER.
In Rosenberg v. W.C.A.B. (Pipe County), No. 17 C.D. 2007, Commonwealth Court looked at the time-of-injury employer’s responsibility to prove whether it had a position available to a partially disabled claimant in the context of a labor market survey.
The claimant was injured in January of 2002 and returned to light duty work with the employer. The claimant’s employment was terminated and she found part-time work on her own.
The insurer filed a Modification Petition after it had performed a labor market survey. The WCJ granted the Modification Petition.
The claimant appealed to the Appeal Board, arguing that the WCJ failed to make a finding regarding available employment with the time-of-injury employer. The matter was remanded to the WCJ and the second time around the WCJ found that a termination letter sent to the claimant meant that the time-of-injury employer did not have work available for the claimant. The WCJ then relied upon Burrell v. W.C.A.B. (Philadelphia Gas Workers and Comp. Services, Inc.), 849 A.2d 1282 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), for the proposition that a time-of-injury employer need not prove the absence of specific jobs as a prerequisite to expert testimony of earning power based on a labor market survey. The claimant again appealed and the Appeal Board affirmed, meaning that the claimant’s benefits were modified based on the labor market survey.
Commonwealth Court agreed with the claimant and held that Section 306 (b)(2) of the Act and 34 Pa. Code Section 123.301 require an employer seeking a modification based upon a labor market survey to show a lack of “ in-house” positions. The Court held that because the claimant raised this issue before the WCJ, the time-of-injury employer ignored the question at its peril.
Ultimately the Court remanded the matter to the WCJ to address the evidence surrounding the availability of a position with the time-of-injury employer.
FIRED CLAIMANT MAY NOT BE ENTITLED TO WAGE LOSS BENEFITS UNDER A CLAIM PETITION IF CLAIMANT RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRING AND NO PENALTIES OR ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDED WHEN EMPLOYER PRESENTED EVIDENCE, IF BELIEVED, THAT WOULD HAVE DEFEATED CLAIM FOR WAGE LOSS BENEFITS.
In the case of Coyne v. W.C.A.B. (Villanova University & PMA Group), No. 710 C.D. 207, the claimant suffered a right foot injury on March 23, 1999. At the time of the injury, claimant was working under an employment contract that ran from June 1, 1998 through May 31, 1999. On May 11, 1999, the claimant was advised that her contract would not be renewed. The claimant obtained employment elsewhere but was later terminated.
The claimant filed a Claim Petition seeking benefits for the right ankle injury. The claimant also filed a Penalty Petition alleging that the insurer violated the Act by failing to investigate her injury and by failing to pay wage loss and medical benefits.
While the claimant’s Petitions were pending, claimant obtained further employment and was later terminated. The claimant then filed a Reinstatement Petition, alleging that she experienced a worsening of her condition resulting in decreased earning power as of May 11, 1999.
A WCJ granted the Claim Petition, finding that the claimant was entitled to various periods of disability between May 31, 1999 and August 25, 2002. The WCJ terminated benefits August 26, 2002. The WCJ denied the Penalty Petition and also found that the insurer presented a reasonable contest.
The Appeal Board remanded and in a second decision, the WCJ concluded that the insurer violated the Act by failing to issue a document accepting an injury following claimant’s fall at work in March of 1999. Also, the WCJ determined that the insurer’s contest was not reasonable and attorney’s fees were awarded. The Appeal Board reversed as to the finding of an unreasonable contest and also as to the granting of the Penalty Petition.
Before, Commonwealth Court the main issue was the claimant’s entitlement to indemnity benefits between May 31, 1999, the date that her employment contract was terminated and August 26, 2002, the date that the WCJ found that the claimant had completely recovered from the work injury. According to the insurer, since claimant’s employment contract was not renewed as of May 31, 1999 the claimant was not entitled to any indemnity benefits thereafter.
In addressing the issue, Commonwealth Court determined that the circumstances surrounding the non-renewal of the claimant’s employment contract needed to be reviewed, to see if claimant was entitled to wage loss benefits.
The Court suggested that in deciding whether a claimant’s benefits should be suspended, it must be determined if the loss of earnings was no longer the result of the work injury. Commonwealth Court noted that in the case, the University presented testimony from 7 witnesses, all who testified that while the claimant was competent at her job, she did not work well with others and was disrespectful to her supervisors, co-workers and others.
The Court felt that the WCJ did not enter into a proper analysis as to whether the University’s decision not to renew the claimant’s contract was based upon claimant’s bad faith conduct. The case was remanded to the WCJ for findings in that regard. In other words, if the WCJ found that the claimant’s contract was not renewed due to the claimant’s own conduct, then the claimant would not be entitled to wage loss benefits on and after May 31, 1999.
Another issue addressed by Commonwealth Court was the claimant’s argument that she should have been awarded indemnity benefits through October 21, 2003--the date of the first Decision and Order, instead of just through August 26, 2002--the date that the WCJ found that she completely recovered from her work injuries. Commonwealth Court quickly rejected this argument, holding that there is nothing in the Act that permits an award of benefits to a claimant who would not otherwise be entitled to them. In other words, the claimant was only successful in proving that she was entitled to benefits for a closed period and that period was not extended by the fact that the litigation went on for years.
The Court then addressed the claimant’s argument that she was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees for an unreasonable contest. The Court disagreed with the claimant, holding that the insurer’s contest was reasonable, because it presented evidence, if believed, that would defeat claimant’s claim for disability benefits. More specifically, the Court noted that there was evidence, if believed, that would place the consequences of the claimant’s discharge from employment, upon claimant. The Court also made note of the fact that the insurer, in its Answer to the Claim Petition, acknowledged that the claimant sustained a work-related injury, but denied that the claimant was entitled to wage loss benefits.
As for the Penalty Petition, the Court acknowledged that the insurer violated the Act by failing to issue a Bureau document accepting or rejecting the injury. However, the Court also noted that this was not what was alleged in the claimant’s Penalty Petition. Rather, the claimant asserted that the Act was violated because the employer failed to properly investigate her claim and failed to pay benefits. The Court noted that when the claimant filed the Penalty Petition, there was no legally operative Bureau document mandating payment of benefits so no benefits were due and owing claimant—thus, the insurer did not violate the Act by refusing to pay benefits that were not actually due and owing, so penalties were not appropriate.
The Court also looked to Section 406.1 of the Act, which indicates that the employer shall promptly investigate each injury reported and shall proceed promptly to commence the payment of compensation or issue a document accepting or controverting the claimant’s right to benefits. The Court determined that there was a distinction between a failure to investigate a claim and failure to issue a Bureau document. Because the claimant’s Penalty Petition only alleged a failure to investigate and not the failure to issue a Bureau document, the Court held that an award of penalties was not warranted.
CLAIMANT NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS FOR LOSS OF USE OF FINGER BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY ALONE.
In Jacobi v. W.C.A.B. (Wawa, Inc.), No. 1110 C.D. 2007, the claimant sustained work-related injuries to his right index and middle fingers. The claimant later sought benefits for a specific loss of his right middle finger as of the date that he underwent surgery to the finger.
It was the claimant’s testimony that following the surgery, he lost strength in the middle finger and that he could not perform activities that required grip strength such as weight lifting and playing softball. The claimant testified that he had pain whenever he used the finger and he did not use the finger when he wrote, typed on a keyboard or brushed his teeth.
The claimant acknowledged that he was able to touch the middle finger to his thumb and that he was able to differentiate between things that were hot/cold, or smooth/rough. The claimant suggested that he was able to grip small items between his middle finger and his thumb and was able to use the finger for activities such as operating a zipper, tying his shoes, shaving and tying a necktie. Meanwhile, the insurer introduced a report from the claimant’s treating surgeon, who opined that the claimant had “done extremely well” after the surgery and was back to work without restrictions. The insurer also submitted a report from an IME doctor, who opined that it was too early to determine if the claimant sustained a specific loss of the middle finger because claimant needed more surgery.
The WCJ granted the Review Petition finding that the claimant sustained a specific loss of use of the right middle finger for all practical intents and purposes. The Appeal Board reversed, holding that the evidence failed to prove that the claimant suffered a permanent loss of use of the middle finger.
Commonwealth Court agreed with the Appeal Board, determining that the claimant’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he had lost the use of the middle finger for all practical intents and purposes. The Court noted that the claimant’s own treating doctor released the claimant to work without restrictions and noted that the claimant only occasionally had pain in the finger and was doing “quite well.”
More importantly, the Court rejected the claimant’s argument that his testimony alone, as to the limitations of the finger, was sufficient to meet his burden of proof. The Court suggested that a claimant must present medical evidence in order to prove that the loss of use is permanent for all practical intents and purposes. Thus, the Court held that claimant’s testimony as to what he could not do with the finger, was not sufficient to meet his burden of proof.
Unreported Case
NO AGREEMENT DURING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SO CLAIMANT COULD NOT FORCE A SETTLEMENT AND CLAIMANT’S LETTERS TO TREATING DOCTOR DISCOVERABLE BY DEFENSE ATTORNEY.
The unreported opinion from Commonwealth Court in Ruia v. W.C.A.B. (New York & Company), No. 1821 C.D. 2007, discusses two issues that bear further review. In the case, a Claim Petition was denied. It turns out that while that Claim Petition was pending, the parties attended a settlement conference. The claimant suggested that the case was settled during the conference, while the insurer disputed that there was a settlement. The claimant actually filed a petition to enforce settlement which was denied by the WCJ, on the basis that the parties had never entered into a Compromise and Release Agreement and the WCJ noted that a hearing to seek approval of a Compromise and Release Agreement had never been held.
Commonwealth Court agreed with the WCJ, that because a Compromise and Release was never presented to the WCJ, there was no valid settlement.
Also, the claimant argued that the WCJ erred in allowing defense counsel to view letters that the claimant sent to her treating physician. The claimant suggested that was in violation of the patient/physician privilege. This argument was rejected by the Court, on the basis that by filing a workers’ compensation claim, the claimant waived her right against disclosing private medical information because she placed her physical/mental condition at issue.
IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT UNREPORTED CASES CAN NOT BE CITED FOR ANY PURPOSES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE REPRODUCED HEREIN FOR INSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES.