SIGNIFICANT LEGAL DECISIONS – PENNSYLVANIA
Burdick v. Erie Insurance Group
2008 Pa. Super. 67
Decided: April 4, 2008
The Pennsylvania Superior Court finds that the insureds are entitled to uninsured motorist (UM) benefits where motorist was operating an uninsured dirt bike when the dirt bike entered the roadway and collided with insureds’ vehicle.
Background: The Burdicks were traveling on a public roadway in Pennsylvania. A minor was operating a dirt bike in a private driveway that intersected with the public roadway. The dirt bike suddenly entered the roadway in front of the Burdicks, and their vehicle collided with the dirt bike and then ran into a ditch. The Burdicks both suffered injuries. The Burdicks were covered by an automobile insurance policy issued by Erie, which included UM coverage. The dirt bike was unregistered and uninsured. The Burdicks submitted a claim for UM benefits to Erie. Erie denied the claim on the basis that the dirt bike was specifically excluded because it was designed for use primarily off road. The trial court found in favor of Erie.
Holding: On appeal, the Burdicks raised two issues: 1) Does a contractual exclusion for a collision with a motor vehicle intended primarily for off-road use violate the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL); and 2) Is a insurance policy contrary to public policy where it attempts to exclude from UM coverage such a claim. The appellate court found that the dirt bike was a motor vehicle under the MVFRL. It noted that first-party medical benefits have limitations which would include dirt bikes, but that section 1731 for UM benefits did not have those limitations, and that the MVFRL thus provided coverage due to the apparent legislative purpose revealed by the lack of limiting language. The court also held that providing coverage was consistent with public policy.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Paul Walker at 717-441-7061 (pwalker@tthlaw.com).
Kopytin v. Aschinger
2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 576
Decided: April 14, 2008
The Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that a jury’s award limited only to medical expenses bore no reasonable relation to the damages suffered by the plaintiff and remanded for a new trial as to damages.
Background: The plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by the defendant’s vehicle. At trial, the plaintiff submitted evidence of $2,540.92 in un-reimbursed medical expenses. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1311.1, the plaintiff intended to submit the report of one of his medical experts, a chiropractor, instead of having him testify. The defendant subpoenaed the chiropractor to testify at trial. The trial court would not permit the plaintiff to read the report by the chiropractor, or provide it to the jury prior to cross-examination of the expert by defendant. The trial court also permitted defendant to cross-examine the chiropractor on issues other than those contained in the report. The trial court further allowed defendant to show a surveillance video of plaintiff despite the fact that it was not authenticated and was produced the day prior to trial. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that the negligence of defendant caused plaintiff injuries. The jury awarded $2,540.92, the amount of un-reimbursed medical expenses. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court.
Holding: The Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court first found that because the jury had decided that the plaintiff was injured by defendant, the jury’s decision to award un-reimbursed medical expenses only, despite the fact that plaintiff’s injuries were of the type that normally involve pain and suffering, bore no reasonable relation to the injuries that plaintiff suffered. Therefore, the jury’s award was inadequate, and plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on damages. The Court further found pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1311.1, that plaintiff was entitled to either have his expert’s report read or provided to the jury prior to defendant cross-examining the expert. It also was error for the trial court to allow defendant to cross-examine the witness on matters beyond the report, such as the expert’s testimony in prior cases, as this was beyond the scope of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1311.1. Lastly, the Court held that a surveillance video depicting plaintiff should not have been shown to the jury, because it was not authenticated and was not produced until the day prior to trial.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Stephanie L. Hersperger at 717-255-7239 or (shersperger@tthlaw.com).
SIGNIFICANT LEGAL DECISIONS – MARYLAND
eNotes welcomes the Maryland practice group. Thomas, Thomas & Hafer opened their Baltimore, Maryland office, January 1, 2008, with attorneys practicing in general liability and workers’ compensation in both, Maryland and the District of Columbia.
David Maurer vs. Pennsylvania National Mutual
Casualty Insurance Company
_ Md. _, 2007 Md. LEXIS 724
Decided: December 7, 2007
Holding: UIM carrier’s consent to the settlement between the tortfeasor’s carrier and the claimant, waives any right to contest liability.
Background: The Plaintiff passenger was involved in an automobile accident and sustained severe injuries. The tortfeasor’s insurance carrier, GEICO, offered to pay the policy limits in an effort to protect its insured. Pennsylvania National consented to the settlement with the tortfeasor and GEICO, but, at the time of trial, challenged any liability to the Plaintiff on the basis that the passenger Plaintiff was contributorily negligent and/or assumed the risk of injury. The evidence at trial was that both, the driver and passenger, consumed excessive amounts of alcohol at a bar prior to the accident. The jury returned a Defendant’s verdict on behalf of Penn National.
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. The Appellate Court found when Penn National consented to the settlement by GEICO they waived their right to contest liability.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Michael H. Burgoyne at (410) 752-0075 or mburgoyne@tthlaw.com
Minh-vu Hoang vs. Hewitt Avenue Associates, LLC
177 Md. App 562, 936 A.2d 915 (2007)
In a case involving a real estate transaction, the trial court awarded damages of $1,889,755.98 on an inquisition after the Defendant failed to vacate a Default Order. However, the Plaintiff, in their Complaint, in their Addendum Clause, sought damages “in excess of $100,000.00.” The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that the trial court committed reversible error in awarding damages greater than the Addendum Clause.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Michael H. Burgoyne at (410) 752-0075 or mburgoyne@tthlaw.com
Mary Susan Crickenberger vs. Hyundai Motor America
_ Md._, 2008 Md. LEXIS 128
Decided: March 21, 2008
A consumer brought suit against the motor vehicle manufacturer for breaching the warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The consumer, without expert testimony, alleged that the vehicle’s continued need for repair established defects in the vehicle and that the Defendant’s failure to cure the defects was a breach. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that both Maryland Law and Federal Law required expert testimony regarding causation.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Michael H. Burgoyne at (410) 752-0075 or mburgoyne@tthlaw.com
Diane Anderson vs. Counsel of Unit Owners of
The Gables on Tuckerman Condominium
_Md._, 2008 Md. LEXIS 189
Decided: April 15, 2008
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the Maryland Condominium Act does not require an association to repair or replace property of a unit owner after a casualty loss. The Court ruled that the Real Property Article, § 11-114, of the Maryland Condominium Act makes it clear that the master insurance policy is intended to cover only damage sustained to the common elements or to the structure of the condominium.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Michael H. Burgoyne at (410) 752-0075 or mburgoyne@tthlaw.com
Mark Anderson vs. General Casualty Insurance Company
402 Md. 236, 935 A.2d 746 (2007)
In this case, the insurance carrier attempted to conduct a financial audit of the policy holder’s business. When no response was received, the insurance carrier canceled the policy, because a financial audit was a condition of the policy. The policy holder challenged the cancellation because the notice was mailed to the insurance agency. The Court held that the use of the broker’s address in the declaration page, under the heading “mailing address”, indicated the parties mutual intent to use that address as the policy holders. Accordingly, the cancellation was proper, and the cancellation notice was proper.
Any questions regarding this case can be directed to Michael H. Burgoyne at (410)752-0075 or mburgoyne@tthlaw.com