SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Fitzpatrick
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
349 A.3d 835
Decided: January 21, 2026
Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that, even when not required, expert testimony presented at trial must still comply with Pennsylvania’s admissibility standards.
Background
This action arose from the drowning death of a woman who had been riding on an ATV with her husband, Defendant Fitzpatrick. The ATV reportedly flipped backwards, throwing them both into a creek. While initial investigations determined that the death was accidental, this was called into question by subsequent investigation. Defendant Fitzpatrick was ultimately charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the forensic pathologist could not offer a definitive opinion on the manner of death and testified that the decedent’s injuries were “consistent with an accident.” While it was “possible” that those injuries were consistent with being held under water, they could also have been caused during attempts of resuscitation or the embalming process. At the conclusion of the case, Defendant Fitzpatrick was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole.
Post-sentence Motions were filed, arguing that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient and did not prove that an unlawful killing occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury must have engaged in speculation to reach their verdict based on the forensic pathologist’s testimony. The Commonwealth subsequently submitted an additional report from the pathologist, who determined “the likelihood of the events just preceding [the decedent’s] death occurring as described by her husband, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, is minimal at best.” The Trial Court acknowledged that the expert was “eminently qualified” to offer an opinion on the cause of death, but that, as to manner of death, he could only speculate.
During the re-trial, on direct examination, the pathologist indicated that he held his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. However, during cross-examination, he retreated from that testimony, ultimately indicating that he “think[s] the manner of death is homicide.”
Defendant was again convicted of first-degree murder. The verdict was appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court concluded that the jury was permitted to determine cause without the assistance of expert testimony. As such, a standard of probability, not certainty, applied to the expert testimony presented by the Commonwealth to aid the jury, and the jury was free to assign the weight to be afforded to the testimony.
Holding
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed. Unlike a lay witness, an expert’s testimony is not limited to what he/she personally observed; rather, experts are permitted to offer an opinion that “embraces an ultimate issue.” Per the Court, an expert’s testimony must adhere to Rule 702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, which provides the qualifying requirements to be met before an expert may provide an opinion. An expert’s opinion must be expressed with reasonably certainty. The Court highlighted that the “reasonable certainty standard” does not require that an expert use any “magic words;” instead, a court must review the substance of the testimony which, however stated, must demonstrate that the opinion was “based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty rather than upon mere speculation.” Looking at the pathologist’s testimony, while he used the “magic words” of reasonable certainty, the remainder of the testimony was found to be, at times, equivocal and speculative, as the pathologist used terms such as “possibly” and “unlikely.” The testimony created doubt as to the degree of professional certainty, such that was not admissible on the issue of the decedent’s manner of death.
Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.
Lindsey v. County of Bucks
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 1171 C.D. 2024
Decided: February 17, 2026
The real property exception to the PSTCA applies even if personal property contributed to the injury, so long as the focus of the claim is real property.
Background
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Bucks County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”). In his cell, the bunk bed and desk were bolted or welded to the floor and walls, but the chairs could be moved. While the bunk beds in the cells initially had ladders welded to them, the ladders were removed after a series of suicides. The cost of non-ligature ladders prevented the installation of replacement ladders. Plaintiff had few options to access the top bunk, as his cellmate’s belongings were on the desk adjacent to the bunk bed, and it was perceived as disrespectful to step on the lower bunk, which could result in a fight. Plaintiff inquired about the absence of ladders and BCCF staff instructed him to use the chair to access the top bunk. Plaintiff attempted to climb to the top bunk using the chair as instructed, but the chair slid out from under him, causing him to fall and injure his left arm.
Plaintiff sued the County for negligence, alleging the County’s removal of the ladder created a dangerous condition that forced him to use an unsafe alternative. The County argued it was immune under the PSTCA. The PSTCA provides that a local agency is generally immune, but may be liable for an injury to a person if the injury would be recoverable under common law, and if it was caused by a negligent act falling within one of nine exceptions. One such exception, the real property exception, provides that a local agency may be liable for negligent acts involving the care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency. In this case, a jury found that the County was negligent. The County then filed a Post-Trial Motion seeking judgment in its favor based on immunity. The Court granted the County’s Post-Trial Motion, vacating the verdict. An appeal followed.
Holding
After determining that the focus should be on the real property itself, the Court held that the County was not immune under the PSTCA. The Court reasoned that the bunk bed was welded or bolted to the wall, making it part of the realty. The County removed the ladder and failed to replace it with a safe alternative, rendering the top bunk unsafe for its intended use. The County then instructed Plaintiff to use a chair to access the top bunk. His only option to access the top bunk was to use the chair, as there was no reasonable alternative. Thus, the County’s negligent care of the real property, i.e. the bunk bed, caused Plaintiff’s injury. While the chair may have contributed to the injury, the basis of the claim was the negligent care of the bunk bed that was welded or bolted to the wall. Accordingly, the real property exception to the PSTCA applied and the County was not immune.
Questions about this case can be directed to Kaylie O’Donnell at (717) 255-7643 or kodonnell@tthlaw.com.
Duffy v. Tatum
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2026 Pa. Super. 41
Decided: March 3, 2026
Pennsylvania Superior Court renders online arbitration clause unenforceable to avoid consumers unknowingly waiving their constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Background
Plaintiff Daniel Duffy hired movers through Dolly, Inc.’s website, clicking “I agree” to their terms and conditions, without knowing he was agreeing to waive his constitutional right to a jury. When the contract went south, and Plaintiff filed suit, Dolly, Inc. (“Dolly”) filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff had agreed to arbitration when he agreed to their terms and conditions. The Trial Court overruled Dolly’s Objections. The Trial Court found that Dolly’s terms and conditions were accessible only by clicking a hyperlink, the clause itself was on the third of several pages, and there were no other warnings of the arbitration provision in the agreement or on the website. Dolly appealed. The question for the Superior Court was whether a person waives their constitutional right to a jury when they enter into an agreement containing an inconspicuous arbitration agreement that was not required to be viewed, read or signed.
The Court first addressed whether an Order denying Preliminary Objections seeking to compel arbitration is immediately appealable as of right. The Court concluded that the matter was immediately appealable because the agreement required arbitration, rather than merely providing for a plethora of methods of alternative dispute resolution. The Court then turned to a two-part test to determine whether arbitration should be compelled. The test asked: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) whether the dispute is within the scope of such agreement. Although the Federal Arbitration Act was discussed, the Court emphasized the concern of the growing use of online contracts and the effect they have on unknowing consumers’ constitutional rights.
Holding
The Court held that the arbitration clause within Dolly’s terms and conditions was unenforceable, and upheld the Order overruling of Dolly’s Preliminary Objections. The Court reasoned that an arbitration provision should only be enforced when it is evident that all parties are aware of it and the effect it has on their right to a trial by jury. Arbitration clauses were compared to confession of judgment clauses, which require explicit, written statements putting the reader on notice of what he/she is agreeing to, and which require a signature directly related to such clause. The Court also stressed that, in waiving the right to a jury trial, criminal defendants must knowingly and intelligently waive such right. In that same vein, civil agreements must also be held to a strict standard. Herein, Plaintiff was never informed of the clause and thus could not be compelled to arbitrate the matter because Dolly’s agreement was hidden on the third page of a hyperlinked document, did not define “arbitration,” and did it specifically state its effect on the consumer’s constitutional right.
Questions about this case can be directed to Danielle Schwartz at (717) 237-7135 or dschwartz@tthlaw.com.
Berton v. NCAA
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 301 EDA 2025
Decided: February 27, 2026
Superior Court affirms Trial Court’s Order of nonsuit on the basis of the statute of limitations where Plaintiff had inquiry notice of his injuries at least six years prior to commencing suit.
Background
In September of 2021, Sean Berton and his wife sued the NCAA in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County alleging, inter alia, negligence and loss of consortium. From 1998-2002, Berton played Division I football at West Virginia University, where he allegedly sustained concussive and sub-concussive injuries. In his Complaint, Berton alleged the NCAA breached its duty to him by failing to enforce an effective concussion protocol, and by concealing material information from him. As a result of the NCAA’s actions and inactions, Berton claimed he suffered from substantial physical injuries, including permanent physical disability. Moreover, Berton claimed he had no reason to know that he had sustained undiagnosed concussions in NCAA Division I football until he read a 1994 NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook in May 2021. The NCAA filed an Answer with New Matter raising, among other things, the defenses of voluntary assumption of the risk and the statute of limitations.
At trial, Berton acknowledged that during a 2016 Worker’s Compensation Proceeding (“WCP”), he testified regarding a hit he sustained while playing for the Minnesota Vikings in 2004, which caused him to sustain a concussion and lose consciousness. Berton also testified at the WCP that, over the next three years, he sustained three additional concussions. Moreover, he testified during the WCP that he experienced ongoing symptoms after August 20, 2004, including memory and cognitive problems. Berton’s medical records revealed a concussion diagnosis in June of 2011. At the close of Berton’s case, the NCAA moved for a compulsory nonsuit. The Trial Court granted the Motion finding, inter alia, that Berton’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Berton and his wife filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
Holding
The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The record showed Berton was on inquiry notice as he had actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form of harm, as well a factual cause linked to the NCAA’s conduct prior to May 2021. A reasonable person, facing the same circumstances confronting Berton, would have known upon the exercise of due diligence that his persistent headaches, dizziness and other complaints could have been factually linked to hits he received while playing five years of NCAA Division I football. Moreover, the statute of limitations for negligence subsumed all of his other causes of actions because the real object of Berton’s claim was to recover damages for his personal injuries.
Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.
Cobb v. Tesla, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2879 EDA 2024
Decided: February 18, 2026
Pennsylvania Superior Court finds valid arbitration agreement existed despite the arbitration provision not being specifically formatted, and despite the absence of language explicitly stating a waiver of the right to a jury.
Background
On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff Cobb filed a class action Complaint against Defendant Tesla, Inc., alleging negligence, breach of implied contract, and breach of confidence. The claims arose from a May 10, 2023 data breach where two former Tesla employees allegedly stole and disclosed employees’ personal information. Prior to her employment at Tesla, Inc., Plaintiff had signed an electronic employment agreement, which included a provision requiring that all disputes related to her employment be resolved through binding arbitration on an individual basis, and not in a class action. The agreement did not define “arbitration,” was not in conspicuous formatting such as bold or capital letters. It also did not explicitly state Plaintiff was waiving her right to a jury trial.
Tesla filed a Petition to compel arbitration and sought a stay of proceedings. The Trial Court denied the Petition, relying heavily on the Superior Court’s en banc decision in Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., which addressed “browsewrap” contracts, conspicuity, and assents in electronic agreements. The Chilutti Court had held that the arbitration provision therein was not sufficiently clear to establish a valid agreement to arbitrate.
Holding
Tesla appealed the Trial Court’s decision in Cobb, arguing that the Trial Court erred in finding the absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Tesla, Inc. The Superior Court emphasized that the existence of an arbitration agreement is determined under the ordinary principles of Pennsylvania contract law, which requires offer, acceptance and consideration. The arbitration provision, which was slightly less than one page in length, was included within the four corners of Plaintiff’s three-and-a-half page employment contract. Plaintiff’s electronic signature at the end of the document complied with the Pennsylvania Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
The Court further held that the absence of bold formatting, a definition of “arbitration,” or explicit waiver of the right to a jury trial, was not “fatal” and did not invalidate the agreement. The arbitration provision contained within the employment contract detailed the scope and process of arbitration, which was sufficient and enforceable. The Court held the arbitration provision was valid and vacated the Trial Court’s Order, remanding the matter to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
Questions about this case can be directed to Rachel Chan at (610) 332-7012 or rchan@tthlaw.com.
Henry v. Colangelo
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 265
Decided: November 26, 2025
Court quashes interlocutory appeal, despite Trial Court’s finality certification, because resolution of the appeal would not facilitate resolution of entire case.
Background
Plaintiff’s claims arose out of the December 13, 2018 suicide of Scott Henry, Plaintiff’s decedent. Broadly speaking, Plaintiff alleged that six Defendants negligently provided care to Plaintiff’s decedent in the months leading up to his death. Following the close of discovery, four of the six Defendants filed Motions for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence sufficient to support her negligence claim against Defendants. However, two Defendants opted not to file Motions for summary judgment at that time.
On November 22, 2024, the Trial Court entered an interlocutory Order granting summary judgment in favor of the four moving Defendants. However, the Order was not a final order under the Rules of Appellate Procedure because Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining two Defendants were still pending. On December 17, 2024, the Trial Court entered an Amended Order stating that the prior Order granting summary judgment constituted a final order because an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of this entire case. An appeal was subsequently filed.
Holding
On appeal, the Superior Court quashed Plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the Trial Court erroneously certified the interlocutory Order as a final order. Generally, a trial court should only certify an interlocutory order as a final order if an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. In making this determination, the Superior Court observed that a trial court should consider: (1) whether there is a significant relationship between adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) whether there is a possibility that an appeal would be mooted by further developments; (3) whether there is a possibly that the court will consider issues a second time; and (4) whether an immediate appeal will enhance the prospects of settlement.
The Superior Court first noted that “the acts and omissions of the dismissed defendants have no connection to whether [the remaining Defendant] and his staff unreasonably failed to return Mr. Henry’s call for help on the day before he killed himself.” Since there was no connection between the claims on appeal and the claims against the remaining Defendants, this factor weighed against finality. Second, the Superior Court opined that, if a jury imposes liability on the remaining Defendants at trial, the issues raised on appeal may be moot because all alleged damages would be satisfied via the judgment against the remaining Defendants. Therefore, this factor weighed against finality. Third, the Superior Court noted that there is no possibility that the Trial Court would have to reconsider its decision to enter judgment in favor of the dismissed Defendants prior to a jury verdict. Consequently, this factor weighed against finality. Lastly, the Superior Court noted that there was no indication that permitting an interlocutory appeal would facilitate settlement. Again, this factor weighed against finality. Accordingly, as all four factors weighed against finality, the Superior Court concluded that the Trial Court erred in certifying the summary judgment Order as final.
Questions about this case can be directed to Adam Kleiber at (717) 237-7157 or akleiber@tthlaw.com.