SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Huggins v. Progressive Adv. Insurance Co.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 965 MDA 2025
Decided: June 18, 2026
Insurer’s omission of the policy number on the UIM coverage rejection form did not invalidate the executed waiver because the insured had one policy.
Background
The plaintiff was injured in a car accident in April 2023, forming the basis of his underinsured motorists (UIM) claim under his motorcycle insurance policy with Progressive. Importantly, the motorcycle policy was his only motor vehicle insurance policy. When he executed the policy in September 2022, plaintiff rejected UIM coverage pursuant to a form provided by Progressive. Accordingly, his UIM claim was denied. Plaintiff sued. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on the rejection of UIM coverage, which was granted by the trial court.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that 75 Pa. C.S. §1731 imposes language and format requirements on an insurer’s form rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, which was not complied with. Such failures, plaintiff argued, rendered his rejection of UIM coverage invalid.
Holding
The Superior Court found that Progressive’s UIM rejection form executed by the insured was wholly compliant with 75 Pa. C.S. §1731. Further, the rejection was not ambiguous despite not containing the policy number. The insured only had one policy, so the lack of a policy number could not have created an ambiguity or uncertainty as to exactly what coverage the insured was waiving, unlike other cases dealing with multiple policies and inter-policy stacking.
The insured’s signature and date on the compliant form effectively waived UIM coverage for his policy. Summary judgment in favor of Progressive was affirmed; the plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed.
Questions about this case can be directed to Caitlyn Corey at (267) 817-7024 or ccorey@tthlaw.com.
King v. Healthcare
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1801 EDA 2025
Decided: May 1, 2026
In an unreported decision, the Superior Court reiterated that if preliminary objections cannot be determined based on facts of record, a non-objecting party has a right to file a response.
Background
On July 3, 2024, Heidi R. King filed a Complaint on behalf of the estate of Anthony J. Robbins, Sr. asserting wrongful death and survival claims arising out of alleged negligent medical care received at the Defendants’ rehab facility, which contributed to his death. The Complaint was served on Defendants on July 26, 2024.
On January 31, 2025, Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Complaint, arguing, inter alia, that venue should be transferred from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County based on the Admission Agreement’s provision that all disputes would be resolved in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.
On February 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed preliminary objections to Defendants’ preliminary objection, arguing untimeliness, but failed to address the merits of Defendants’ preliminary objections. On March 27, 2025, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiff’s preliminary objections to Defendants’ preliminary objections.
On June 10, 2025, the Court sustained Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and transferred venue to Montgomery County; the trial court did not rule on Plaintiff’s preliminary objections to Defendants’ preliminary objections. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was granted. The trial court then overruled Plaintiff’s preliminary objections to Defendants’ preliminary objections; sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections to venue; and transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Plaintiff timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred as Plaintiff was not provided an opportunity to respond to the merits of Defendants’ preliminary objections.
Holding
The Superior Court held that after the trial court overruled plaintiff’s preliminary objections regarding timeliness, plaintiff had a right to substantively respond to Defendants’ preliminary objections as it raised an issue of fact and was endorsed with a notice to plead. The trial court’s order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections and transferring venue was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions for Plaintiff to file a responsive pleading to Defendants’ preliminary objections.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at (717) 255-7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Levin v. Prime Commc’ns Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 874 EDA 2025
Decided: June 9, 2026
Arbitration cannot be compelled unless mutually agreed upon. A reasonable person would appreciate clicking “I agree” following an arbitration agreement legally binds him to the agreement.
Background
David Levin initiated the lawsuit against Prime and AT&T alleging breach of an employment agreement and other related claims. Prime and AT&T filed preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration based on the mutual agreement to arbitrate in Levin’s employment agreements.
In both the 2019 and 2022 agreements, the mutual agreement to arbitrate was not signed by Levin but was electronically acknowledged by Levin using his unique username and password on the online human resources system, checking the box “I agree.”
The trial court overruled Prime and AT&T’s preliminary objections. The trial court held that both versions of the MAA required Levin’s signature, however, none of the exhibits Prime & AT&T supplied contained proof of signature, electronically or otherwise. The court found that Prime and AT&T had not produced evidence of Levin’s signature on an arbitration agreement, and the court could not properly consider the extrinsic evidence presented regarding the electronic acknowledgement of the arbitration agreement, as it was extrinsic evidence. Prime and AT&T appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court noted that arbitration cannot be compelled unless expressly agreed upon, in which case, the party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the parties manifested an assent to be bound by an arbitration agreement. Assent to an arbitration agreement is determined based on what a reasonable person in the position of the party would be led to understand by such conduct under all of the surrounding circumstances.
Electronic signatures are defined as “[a]n electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” Pennsylvania Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). A “click-through” process, if attributed and “executed with an intent to ‘sign’” constitutes an electronic signature. Id.
The Superior Court held that a reasonable person in Levin’s position would understand that his action of clicking through would constitute a signature and legally bind him to the arbitration agreement. The trial court order was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at (717) 255-7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Pitts v Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2834 EDA 2025
Decided: June 23, 2026
In an unpublished opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of a compulsory nonsuit in a slip and fall case where there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to establish a right to relief.
Background
Pitts filed suit against Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. (“Sonesta”) alleging she slipped on the hotel’s wet foyer floor causing injuries. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where video evidence was presented showing the hotel’s maintenance technician mopping the floor prior to Pitts’ fall. Yellow warning signs were in place, warning of the wet floor, and the foyer was well lit. At the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Sonesta moved for entry of compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted. Pitts appealed.
Pitts argues that the trial court improperly resolved factual issues against her and that she produced evidence establishing a claim of negligence. She also argued that the wet-floor danger was not known and obvious to her as a matter of law and that the adequacy of the wet-floor signs as a warning is a question of fact for the factfinder. Sonesta disagreed, arguing that “whether a danger is ‘known’ is assessed subjectively, while whether a danger is ‘obvious’ is assessed objectively based on a reasonable person standard. Sonesta asserts that Pitts fell only after she saw the warning sign; even if a warning was required, the landowner’s only duty is to “use reasonable care to warn the visitor.” Since there can be no duty where the dangerous condition is obvious, there can be no breach of duty where there is an obvious warning.
Holding
The Superior Court found that Pitts presented no evidence that Sonesta breached its duty and that Pitts failed to assert a prima facie claim of negligence. Evidence presented at trial revealed Sonesta placed two warning signs in the wet foyer which were visible from the lobby through the clear glass doors and surrounding windows. Pitts herself admitted to seeing the wet-floor sign before taking her second step into the foyer, the step during which she fell. There was no evidence that Sonesta had knowledge that their two wet-floor signs were inadequate to warn business invitees of the danger of a slippery floor, nor could any witnesses recall any prior slip-and-fall accidents occurring in the vestibule. Consequently, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of compulsory nonsuit against Appellant.
Questions about this case can be directed to Claire O’Neill at (717) 237-7133 or coneill@tthlaw.com and Hugh O’Neill at (717) 237-7105 or honeill@tthlaw.com.