SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Brown v. Gaydos
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
351 A.3d 699
Decided: February 18, 2026
A court must consider whether the defendant was working in the same course of employment as the injured employee to determine if co-employee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) applies.
Background
Brown was injured working for American Concrete Solutions, Inc. (ACS) when he attempted to enter a skid loader and was crushed by its hydraulic arm. The skid loader was owned and maintained by Defendant Gaydos, who operated Gaydos Construction, a sole proprietorship, prior to co-owning ACS. Gaydos loaned the skid loader to ACS as needed. Gaydos was not present when Brown was injured. Brown received workers’ compensation benefits from ACS. Brown then filed a civil action against Gaydos alleging failure to maintain the skid loader and to train or supervise ACS employees regarding its safe operation. The lower court granted summary judgment finding Gaydos immune under the Act. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Gaydos’s allegedly negligent acts occurred while he was “in the same employ” as Brown.
Holding
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that Gaydos needed to be acting in the course and scope of his duties at ACS at the time of Brown’s injury to be “in the same employ” within the meaning of the co-employee immunity provisions under the Act. The evidence showed that Gaydos owned and maintained the skid loader. Gaydos stored the skid loader on property he owned when it was not in use. There was no lease or transfer of money for the use of the skid loader. Gaydos speculated that the seat sensor safety mechanism failed during the accident and Gaydos admitted that he did not frequently check that the sensor was functioning. Gaydos also hypothesized that the foot pedal controlling the hydraulic arm must have struck Brown in the accident and that Gaydos was aware of this mechanical problem happening on two prior occasions but did not fix it.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s order, holding that Section 72 co-employee immunity applies only to acts or omissions that occur while the defendant and the injured worker are in the same employ, meaning acting in the course or scope of their employment. There was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Gaydos’ alleged negligence occurred while he and Brown were in the same employ or whether they occurred in Gaydos’s separate and independent role as an individual or as owner of a sole proprietorship.
Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.
City of Philadelphia v. J.S.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
353 A.3d 566
Decided: March 26, 2026
Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) waives tort immunity of political subdivisions for sexual abuse only if the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.
Background
J.S. was an adult when he was arrested and transported to Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility. J.S. alleges that prison employees sexually assaulted him while he was in his waiting cell by forcing an unknown object into his buttocks. J.S. was transported to the hospital where he was intubated and diagnosed with serious injuries, including rib fractures and kidney injury. J.S. filed a civil action against the City of Philadelphia asserting sexual abuse claims along with claiming the City was negligent in failing to train, screen, and monitor its employees; appropriately staff the prison; and protect inmates.
The City filed preliminary objections claiming governmental immunity under PSTCA. The City acknowledged the PSTCA provides an exception for negligent acts constituting sexual abuse, however, the City argued that such exception only applies if the victim was a minor at the time of abuse. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections and directed the City to file an Answer. A permissive interlocutory appeal to the Commonwealth Court followed. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court in a unanimous, unreported en banc decision, and remanded to the trial court. J.S. petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for appeal, which was granted.
Holding
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the purpose of Section5551(7) is to lift the statute of limitations for minor victims of the listed offenses, and the Section explicitly adds a requirement that the victim be a minor at the time of the crime. The court notes that J.S. hyper focuses on the word “conduct” in Section 8542(b)(9) to manufacture an ambiguity in the provision, where there is no ambiguity. A plain reading of the sexual abuse exception to the PSTCA unambiguously incorporates the age limitation in Section 5557(1) when it refers to “conduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7) (relating to no limitation applicable).”
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at (717) 255-7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Busanic v. Premier Orthopaedic & Sports Med. Physical Therapy
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 852 EDA 2025
Decided: April 28, 2026
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirms a damages award of $0 after a jury finds that despite Defendant’s negligence, such negligence was not the factual cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
Background
On July 31, 2018, Plaintiff Matthew Busanic attended a physical therapy session at Premier Orthopedics & Sports Medicine to rehabilitate a sprained ankle. During the session, Plaintiff completed exercises utilizing a TheraBand at the instruction of a physical therapy aide. The aide walked away momentarily when, suddenly, the TheraBand came loose from under Plaintiff’s foot, snapped up, and struck him in the eye. Resultingly, Plaintiff underwent five eye surgeries, and suffers from permanent vision loss. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought suit against Premier alleging Premier was negligent in failing to supervise Plaintiff, failing to properly instruct him on the exercises and the potential dangers associated with using the TheraBand, and that such negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries.
The case went to trial, in which Premier’s primary argument was not that the incident did not happen, or that Plaintiff did not sustain injuries, but that any negligence attributed to Premier was not the factual cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Specifically, Premier argued that no testimony had been given, nor had any evidence been presented, that showed the incident could have been stopped or avoided had supervision or instruction been any different. The jury was to decide three questions: (1) was Premier negligent, (2) if yes, was Premier’s negligence the factual cause of Plaintiff’s harm, and (3) if yes, what amount of damages is Plaintiff entitled to? The jury found Premier was negligent, but that Premier’s negligence was not the factual cause of Plaintiff’s harm, and thus awarded Plaintiff no damages. Plaintiff moved for a new trial solely on damages, arguing that the verdict was inconsistent, not supported by the evidence, contrary to the weight of the evidence, shocking to the conscience, and afoul of the instructions from the court. The trial court granted the motion and awarded a new trial on damages. Premier appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court acknowledged that a new trial is justified only where a jury’s verdict is so contradictory to the evidence that it “shocks one’s sense of justice.” The trial court stated it granted Plaintiff’s motion based on the fact that Premier did not contest causation, and that the court’s instructions to the jury were that it must award damages if it found Premier to be negligent. To the contrary, the Superior Court recognized that the trial court conflated Premier’s concession as to how the injury happened with the factual cause of the injury. Moreover, the Superior Court found that the jury did follow instructions, based on the wording of the instructions themselves, as well as the wording on the verdict slip. Ultimately, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on damages as the jury was justified in finding Premier to be negligent yet still agreeing Premier’s negligence was not the factual cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court order granting a new trial was vacated and the case was remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict.
Questions about this case can be directed to Danielle Schwartz at (717) 237-7135 or dschwartz@tthlaw.com.