SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Significant Case Summaries
Boyer v. Barclay Friends
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2292 EDA 2024
Decided: August 31, 2026
Nonsignatory defendant may enforce arbitration agreement where claims are closely intertwined.
Background
These consolidated appeals arose from a November 2017 fire at the senior living facility in West Chester, Pennsylvania, Barclay Friends. Former residents and representatives of residents’ estates asserted claims against Barclay Friends and Johnson Controls Fire Protection, LP (“Johnson”), alleging that the defendants’ failures concerning the facility’s fire suppression system contributed to the injuries and deaths resulting from the fire. The complaints alleged that Barclay Friends and Johnson were jointly and severally liable and asserted overlapping allegations concerning the inspection, maintenance, and operation of the fire suppression system.
The residents each had executed admission agreements with Barclay Friends containing mandatory arbitration provisions. Although Johnson was not a signatory to those agreements, Johnson filed preliminary objections seeking to enforce the arbitration provision and proceed with arbitration alongside Barclay Friends. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections, which prompted Johnson to appeal. In the interim, the Superior Court determined that the claims against Barclay Friends fell within the scope of the arbitration provision and subsequently held that the claims for recklessness and punitive damages were also subject to arbitration.
Holding
The Superior Court reversed the trial court and held that Johnson could enforce the arbitration agreement despite being a nonsignatory. The Court concluded that an “obvious and close nexus” existed between Johnson, Barclay Friends, and the arbitration agreements because Plaintiffs’ allegations against both defendants were intertwined and Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the same conduct. The Court reasoned that allowing Plaintiffs to avoid arbitration merely by asserting related claims against a non-signatory would undermine the arbitration agreement and could result in inconsistent outcomes. Accordingly, the Court ordered the Plaintiffs’ claims against Johnson and Barclay Friends proceed to arbitration together.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at (717) 255-7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Commonwealth v. Gomery
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 444 * | 2026 PA Super 187 | 2026 LX 411838
Decided: August 27, 2026
The Superior Court holds that a passive, though knowing, failure to provide information does not constitute a deceptive act required by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 to constitute crimen falsi.
Background
Edwards Gomery and his girlfriend, Diana Knoebel, lived together in an apartment. Their friend, Jeremy Skowronski, had romantic feelings for Knoebel. Gomery knew of Skowronski’s feelings. On August 26, 2024, Knoebel called Skowronski, who thereafter went to her and Gomery’s apartment. As Knoebel and Skowronski stepped into the apartment, Gomery struck Skowronski repeatedly with a machete, and continuously kicked him. Skowronski was unarmed. Gomery yelled at Skowronski to leave, and Skowronski fled, bleeding from injuries to his head, elbow, shoulders, and neck. Knoebel called 911 and reported the attack.
Gomery was charged with, among other things, attempted murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He was convicted on all charges except attempted murder and was sentenced to eight and one-half years to twenty years in prison.
Prior to trial, Gomery filed a motion in limine to cross examine Skowronski on his prior conviction related to his failure to update his address in the sex offender registry. The Court denied Gomery’s motion. Following his conviction, Gomery appealed to the Superior Court based on the Court’s denial of his motion in limine, arguing that Skowronski’s conviction constituted crimen falsi (a crime of dishonesty), making it admissible for purposes of impeachment. Pennsylvania’s Rules of Evidence state a witness’s prior crimen falsi conviction must be admitted.
Holding
The Superior Court had to determine whether Skowronski’s prior conviction qualified as crimen falsi. The Court found it did not. A conviction constitutes crimen falsi only if “dishonesty or [a] false statement is either: (1) an essential element of the offense, or (2) facilitated its commission.” Furthermore, crimen falsi “requires an element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness’s propensity to testify truthfully.” In the instant case, the Court found that Skowronski’s conviction was based on a failure to act, rather than any affirmative misrepresentation. The Court ruled that a passive failure to act, even if the failure is knowing, is not the dishonest conduct contemplated by the Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, Gomery’s motion in limine was properly denied, as Skowronski’s conviction does not qualify as crimen falsi. Gomery’s conviction was affirmed.
Questions about this case can be directed to Danielle Schwartz at (717) 237-7135 or dschwartz@tthlaw.com.
Gabra v. Borough of Prospect Park
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 1343 C.D. 2024
Decided: June 18, 2026
Court holds that paved pathway in a park is not a street under the exceptions to governmental immunity under Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.
Background
Plaintiffs’ decedent was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his brother who entered the Moore’s Lake Park using a paved pathway that ended immediately past a pavilion. Plaintiffs’ decedent exited the vehicle to direct his brother. As decedent’s brother drove the car, he accidently struck and ran over the Plaintiffs’ decedent causing his death. Plaintiffs commenced an action against the Borough seeking relief under the Streets Exception and Sidewalk Exception to governmental immunity. The Borough filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of law, the Streets Exception and Sidewalk Exception do not apply, and the Borough is entitled to governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and the Borough appealed.
Holding
The Commonwealth Court noted that a throughfare is a street because of its physical characteristics, location, primary and intended use, and legal description of record. Thus, whether the paved pathway is a street is a legal determination based on record facts and not based on the brother’s subjective belief that he turned onto a street. The testimony supported that the pathway’s primary use was for employees and as short term access for youth club members loading equipment or items for concessions. The Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof and no evidence was offered that the pathway was used for travel and there was no evidence that the pathway afforded an unobstructed exit at each end into another street or public passage. Further, based on an ordinance, vehicular traffic was prohibited in all Borough parks and therefore the intended purpose of the pathway was not vehicular traffic.
Reversing the lower court, the Commonwealth Court held that the Street Exception and Sidewalk Exception do not apply to the paved pathway in the park and concrete base around the pavilion. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the area in which the accident happened is considered a street owned by a local agency and the lower court erred a matter of law by not granting summary judgment. Also, the lower court erred because the concrete base surrounding the pavilion is not a sidewalk within the right-of-way of a local agency street as a matter of law.
Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.
Smith v. Erie Ins. Exch.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1127 WDA 2025
Decided: September 3, 2026
Superior Court reinforces applicability and enforceability of “regular use” exclusion and restriction on stacking benefits.
Background
Two insureds, the Smiths, challenged the denial of underinsured motorists (“UIM”) coverage under their personal automobile insurance policy. The Smiths sought coverage in excess of the amounts recovered from the liability carrier for the at-fault driver and the UIM policy insuring Mr. Smith’s employer’s vehicle, which he was driving at the time of the accident.
The Smiths’ policy contained a regular use exclusion: “UIM coverage does not apply to: Bodily injury to ‘you’ or a resident’ using a non-owned ‘motor vehicle’ or a ‘non-owned’ miscellaneous vehicle which is regularly used by ‘you’ or a ‘resident’ but not insured for Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this policy”. The policy also provided for stacked benefits for their three vehicles.
Holding
The Superior Court examined recent decisions assessing applicability of “regular use” exclusions and their harmony with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, which permits stacking of UM/UIM benefits when more than one vehicle is insured under one or more policies providing UM/UIM coverage. Such “regular use” exclusions have been consistently upheld and enforced in Pennsylvania.
The Court held that the claimants were not named insureds on their employer’s policy under which they seek to recover, despite their purchasing stacked UIM benefits on their own personal policy. One can only stack UM/UIM benefits across policies if they are insured under both policies.
Questions about this case can be directed to Caitlyn Corey at (267) 817-7024 or ccorey@tthlaw.com.
Smith v. Timar
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1942 EDA 2024
Decided: September 9, 2026
The Pennsylvania Superior Court holds Plaintiff was entitled to increased risk of harm jury instruction in medical malpractice action.
Background
The case arose from cervical spinal manipulations performed by Chiropractor Timar on Plaintiff, who alleged that the manipulations caused a vertebral artery dissection that ultimately resulted in a stroke and permanent impairment. Plaintiff maintained that the cervical manipulations were unnecessary because he had presented with mild lower-back pain and had not complained of neck pain. At trial, the jury found that Chiropractor Timar was negligent but that his negligence was not a factual cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed that causation could be established where negligent conduct increased the risk of the type of harm that ultimately occurred.
Holding
The Superior Court noted that Pennsylvania law permits an increased risk of harm theory where the plaintiff establishes that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care, the failure increased the risk of physical harm, and the harm in fact occurred. Plaintiff’s expert testified that cervical manipulation was associated with an increased risk of vertebral artery dissection. The Court determined that this evidence, together with the jury’s finding of negligence and the occurrence of the dissection, was sufficient to warrant the requested instruction. The Court further concluded that the omission was prejudicial because the jury was never permitted to determine whether Chiropractor Timar’s negligence increased the risk of the injury.
The Superior Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to causation and damages. The Court concluded that Chiropractor Timar’s negligence had been fairly determined by the original jury and therefore did not need to be retried. On remand, the jury will determine whether Chiropractor Timar’s negligence increased the risk of Plaintiff’s suffering the vertebral artery dissection and, if so, the appropriate damages.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson, at (717) 255-7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Trepanowski v. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 841 EDA 2025
2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2291, 2026 WL 2547022 (non-precedential)
Decided: August 28, 2026
Repairs to an occupied residence does not restart Pennsylvania’s 12-year construction statute of repose when the claims arise from defects in the original construction.
Background
The homeowners purchased a newly constructed home after a certificate of occupancy was issued on October 25, 2007. Hovnanian, the home builder, later retained Labuda Home Improvement to perform stucco remediation to the homeowners’ home in 2011. Moisture inspections in 2021 revealed substantial defects, and the homeowners filed suit in March 2023. The homeowners alleged that the original construction and the 2011 stucco work were defective.
The trial court entered summary judgment for Hovnanian and the other defendants under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536. On appeal, the homeowners argued that the 2011 work created a new improvement and a new repose period, that code violations made the work unlawful, and that factual disputes concerning Labuda barred summary judgment.
Holding
The Superior Court affirmed. Under Venema v. Moser Builders, Inc., the repose period began when the 2007 certificate of occupancy established completion and ran without interruption; later repairs did not restart or toll it. The homeowners also waived any developed argument that the 2011 work independently qualified as an improvement. Their reliance on alleged code violations failed because it addressed the 2011 repairs rather than the original construction and, in any event, Johnson v. Toll Brothers, Inc. holds that construction is lawful for section 5536 when the builder is authorized to perform it and a certificate of occupancy issues. The claims involving Labuda likewise arose from the original construction and were barred.
Questions about this case can be directed to Matthew Banyas at (412) 926-1441 or mbanyas@tthlaw.com.