SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Wunderly v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem, Pa.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 119 MAP 2023
Decided: October 23, 2025
Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act extends to physical injuries that are coincident to involuntary mental health commitments.
Background
Decedent Kenneth E. Wunderly was involuntarily admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem and treated for dementia-related aggression. While being stabilized, Decedent required treatment for Stage I pressure ulcers to his left and right buttocks present upon admission. During his hospital stay, he acquired pressure related skin breakdown, pressure wounds, and deterioration of existing pressure wounds. Approximately two weeks later, Decedent had unstageable pressure ulcers to his right buttocks and posterior perineum, and deep tissue injury pressure wounds to his left buttocks and left heel. He was transferred to another facility and then died ten days later. A wrongful death and survival action was brought against St. Luke’s Hospital and its affiliates, where it was alleged that the Decedent’s pressure ulcers and wounds caused and/or contributed to his physical decline and ultimate death.
In its Answer with New Matter, St. Luke’s argued that absent allegations of willful misconduct or gross negligence, it was immune from liability pursuant to Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) because the Decedent was involuntarily admitted to its facility under Section 302 of the MHPA and remained in its care under Section 303 of the MHPA. Section 114 of MHPA provides protection, absent willful misconduct or gross negligence, from civil and criminal liability to institutions and individuals who participate in a decision that a person be examined or treated under the Act. This matter came to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the Superior Court unanimously affirmed the Trial Court’s Order granting St. Luke’s Motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Holding
The Court looked to other sections of the MHPA because Section 114 of the MHPA does not define “treated,” ultimately determining that the plain reading of definitions of similar terms in the MHPA make it clear that treatment encompasses a wide array of basic care needs and other issues that may require medical treatment alongside mental health treatment. “Treatment” does not only encompass what is specifically directed toward recovery from a mental illness, but also encompasses basic care needs and other foreseeable medical issues that may or may not be directly related to mental health treatment, but nevertheless require attention during the patient’s admission.
The Court determined that St. Luke’s actions regarding the Decedent’s pressure ulcers constituted treatment under the MHPA, as it was coincident to his treatment for dementia, and pressure ulcers are a foreseeable complication during an elderly patient’s inpatient treatment for a mental health condition and one that is consistent with the scope of the term “treated.” The Court affirmed in favor of St. Luke’s because St. Luke’s treated the Decedent and Plaintiff failed to allege anything beyond ordinary negligence.
Questions about this case can be directed to Kaylie O’Donnell at (717) 255-7643 or kodonnell@tthlaw.com.
Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 43 EAP 2024
Decided: October 23, 2025
Supreme Court upholds statutory employer test as described in McDonald and Fonner.
Background
McCarthy entered into a contract with the Borough of Norwood to remove and replace the roof on the local library. McCarthy and RRR Contractors, Inc. entered into a subcontract to perform this work. Jason Yoder worked for RRR. While working on the Library’s roof, Yoder fell through an uncovered hole and sustained severe and permanent disabling injuries that will require pain management for the rest of his life. Yoder filed a Complaint against McCarthy with claims sounding in negligence. McCarthy filed a late Answer, which was struck by the Trial Court. Prior to trial through Cross-Motions in limine, the Trial Court held that McCarthy waived its statutory employer defense. Following trial, the jury unanimously determined that McCarthy was negligent.
The Superior Court vacated the Trial Court’s judgment, relying on prior case law that McCarthy did not waive its statutory employer defense for failure to raise it in its Answer, as this relates to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After applying the McDonald test, the Superior Court held that McCarthy was Yoder’s statutory employer and therefore immune from tort liability.
Holding
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the principle of stare decisis and explained that it could not overturn the clear precedent laid out by this Court and noted that there were no arguments asserted to overturn said precedent. In cases such as Fonner and McDonald, this Court has clearly stated the five elements to determine a statutory employer. To create the relation of statutory employer under Section 203 of the Act, all of the following elements essential to a statutory employer’s liability must be present: an employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner; premises occupied by or under the control of such employer; a subcontract made by such employer; part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such subcontractor; and an employee of such subcontractor.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Pierce v. Floatme Corp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 247
Decided: November 4, 2025
Pennsylvania Superior Court deems phone application’s ambiguous arbitration clause as not reasonably conspicuous under the law and thus not binding on consumers.
Background
Defendant, Floatme Corporation, owns a mobile phone application that provides payday loans to consumers. The internet application allows consumers to obtain loans up to $50 a week, along with a $3.99 monthly subscription fee, and a fee ranging from $3.00 and $5.00 based on the amount of the advance. Floatme advertises its cash advance as free credit, and no interest. The fees together exceed the Pennsylvania interest rate maximum. Plaintiff Natalie Pierce subscribed and paid the exorbitant fees. She sued on behalf of a class of residents of Harrisburg Pennsylvania, arguing the fees violate the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law and the Consumer Discount Company Act.
Floatme Corporation filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint, citing the application’s binding arbitration agreement. The “agreement” was on the third of sixteen pages where Plaintiff was to input personal information in order to sign up for the loan. The language merely stated: “By continuing, you agree to FloatMe’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy,” which was linked. If the link were clicked, which was not mandatory to continue, it would bring the user to the arbitration agreement. The statement was written in small font and was not easy to read. Defendant argued that Plaintiff was on notice of the agreement to arbitrate the matter. The Trial Court held that the notice of FloatMe’s Terms and Conditions was not reasonably conspicuous and that there was no unambiguous assent manifested by Plaintiff under current Pennsylvania law, as FloatMe’s application screen does not explicitly state that a consumer is waiving a right to a jury trial, and the waiver does not appear at the top of the first page of FloatMe’s Terms and Conditions.
Holding
The Superior Court agreed with the Trial Court’s ruling. It upheld the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that Defendant FloatMe could not compel binding arbitration.
Questions about this case can be directed to Chelsea Williams at (267) 861-7599 or cwilliams@tthlaw.com.
Dumond, Inc. v. Galgano
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 210
Decided: September 19, 2025
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirms dismissal of legal malpractice action against out-of-state attorney for lack of personal jurisdiction where the defendant-attorney operated primarily in New York and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania.
Background
Plaintiffs Dumond, Inc. and Dumond Chemicals, Inc. were manufacturing companies incorporated in New York and operating primarily within Pennsylvania. Defendant Thomas M. Galgano of Galgano IP Law, PLLC was an attorney based in New York. Dumond retained Galgano to evaluate one of Dumond’s products for potential trademark infringement. Upon the advice of Galgano, Dumond began marketing and selling the product in question. Dumond was subsequently sued by a third-party in federal district court for trademark infringement.
In turn, Dumond brought suit for legal malpractice against Galgano in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that Galgano’s legal advice caused the third-party lawsuit. Upon consideration of Galgano’s Preliminary Objections, the Trial Court dismissed Dumond’s legal malpractice claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Holding
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Trial Court’s dismissal of Dumond’s legal malpractice claim against Galgano for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the minimum contacts analysis for specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny, the Superior Court held that Dumond failed to demonstrate that Galgano had purposefully availed himself of the state such that Pennsylvania courts could exercise personal jurisdiction.
The Superior Court’s decision was based on three key conclusions. First, the Superior Court rejected the argument that Galgano’s maintenance of a passive website, which is accessible in Pennsylvania, constitutes sufficient contact with the state to support personal jurisdiction. Second, the Superior Court rejected the argument that mail sent by Galgano to Dumond’s offices in Pennsylvania constitute sufficient contact where Galgano sent just four letters and only one of these letters was related to the legal advice at issue. Finally, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the mere foreseeability of injury to Dumond as a Pennsylvania resident did not in itself give rise to personal jurisdiction where Galgano only provided the legal advice at issue while based in New York.
Questions about this case can be directed to Joseph Badami at (610) 332-7005 or jbadami@tthlaw.com.
Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2340
Decided: September 8, 2025
Superior Court affirmed dismissal based on forum non conveniens where alternative jurisdiction would provide easier access to sources of proof and witnesses.
Background
Plaintiffs Robert and Phyllis Dickerson filed this action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on July 29, 2019, alleging that Mr. Dickerson developed Myelodysplastic Syndrome (“MSD”) as the result of occupational exposure to benzene containing products during the course of his employment in North Carolina. The Dickersons were North Carolina residents, and at no point lived or worked in Pennsylvania. Defendants were companies that manufactured, sold, marketed and/or distributed products containing benzene, and Mr. Dickerson allegedly worked with those products. In 2023, Defendants filed Motions to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, contending that the Trial Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and grant Plaintiffs leave to refile their case in North Carolina.
The Trial Court held oral argument on the issue. At that time, only four Defendants remained, with only one being a Pennsylvania corporation. The Trial Court entered its Order granting Defendants’ Motion. The Trial Court concluded, inter alia, that trial in North Carolina would provide easier access to sources of proof, North Carolina Courts and juries would have more of an interest in Mr. Dickerson’s case, and that the vast majority of Mr. Dickerson’s workplace exposure to benzene was alleged to have occurred from products with no shown manufacturing connection to Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
Holding
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Trial Court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion to dismiss. Orders on motions to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Such an abuse occurs if there was an error of law or the judgment was manifestly unreasonable. The Superior Court concluded the Trial Court’s Opinion was well-reasoned and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Opinion and adopted it as its own.
Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.
Dengler v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1616 EDA 2024
Decided: August 6, 2025
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld Nationwide’s denial of Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”) benefits as Plaintiff was occupying a work vehicle while “vehicle orientated” and was engaged in a “transaction essential to the use of the vehicle,” making the regular use exclusion enforceable and applicable.
Background
Troy and Lynnea Dengler appealed an Order granting summary judgment in favor of Nationwide Property and Casualty Company. Troy was stuck by a vehicle while unloading a car carrier in the course of his employment. He suffered serious injuries and later settled with the tortfeasors and resolved his workers’ compensation claim. At the same time, the Denglers had a Nationwide auto policy which provided for uninsured and underinsured, motor coverage with stacked coverage. The underinsured claim under the Employer’s policy was settled for $15,000.
The Denglers then instituted an action against Nationwide for breach of contract after Nationwide denied UIM benefits under the Dengler’s personal policy based on the regular use exclusion. The Denglers argued that Troy occupied the vehicle for regular use but not insured under the Nationwide policy. They claimed that the regular use exclusion violated the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), and the facts of the case does not warrant the application of regular use. No factual disputes existed, and the legal question was whether Troy occupied the car carrier under the Utica four-part test. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Nationwide and found that the exclusion was enforceable under Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. 2024), and concluded that Troy was occupying the vehicle under regular use.
Holding
The Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. The Court held that the regular use exclusion did not violate the MVFRL under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Rush. In applying only prongs three and four of the Utica test, as prongs one and two were undisputed (causal connection and vehicle close proximity), the Court concluded that Troy was “vehicle orientated” and was engaging in a “transaction essential to the use of the vehicle” when he released pins in preparation of unloading the car carrier. His actions were comparable to prior cases where working on an attached component of the vehicle constituted vehicle orientation and essential use. Therefore, Troy was occupying the vehicle and the regular use exclusion applied. As there were no factual disputes, Nationwide was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as the denial of UIM coverage was enforceable and applicable.
Questions about this case can be directed to Rachel Chan at (610) 332-7012 or rchan@tthlaw.com.