SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Mack v. Pa. State Police
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 9 M.D. 2021
Decided November 25, 2025
Private right of action for H&L Act beneficiaries to recover funds paid to an employer after a wrongful assertion of subrogation lien recognized by Commonwealth Court.
Background
Martin Mack, deceased, was working as a Pennsylvania State Trooper when his squad car was involved in an accident with another driver on November 30, 2018. Mack filed a claim for benefits under the Heart and Lung Act (53 P.S. § 637) (“H&L Act”) and a tort suit against the other driver. Mack’s Petition was granted and the tort action was subsequently settled. On March 19, 2020, counsel for the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) sent Mack a letter asserting the subrogation lien under Section 319 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”), demanding payment of Mack’s tort settlement funds. Mack complied, remitting $20,826.58 to PSP, and proceeded to file a Complaint seeking recovery of the same, arguing that the lien cannot be asserted against H&L beneficiaries. PSP filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint, arguing that the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), under which subrogation of H&L benefits for injuries arising from on-the-job car accidents is barred, does not provide a private right of action in the event of wrongful assertion of the lien.
Holding
The Commonwealth Court decided that such a private cause of action does exist. Mack, as a recipient of H&L benefits (as opposed to WCA benefits) is within the class of people for whom the legislature intended continued protection, the legislature did not indicate any intention to grant nor deny such a right, and a private right of action was deemed consistent with the MVFRL’s purpose. With two out of three factors in Mack’s favor and the third one neutral, Mack’s claim was allowed to proceed over PSP’s Preliminary Objections.
Employers and insurers need to be mindful of whether a successful claimant in workplace motor vehicle cases recovered under the WCA or H&L Act, as they do not have a subrogation lien against other recoveries by H&L beneficiaries.
Questions about this case can be directed to Charles Nutaitis at 610.332.7020 or cnutaitis@tthlaw.com.
Faucon v. Parkland Area Sch. Dist.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 1349 C.D. 2024
Decided: October 21, 2025
The Commonwealth Court holds that the real property exception to the PSTCA does not apply when an injury is caused by personalty that is merely on real property.
Background
Plaintiff alleged that her daughter, Student, was injured in gym class while in the weight room of Parkland Area High School. It was alleged that Student approached a weight that was leaning against the wall, and then it suddenly fell on her foot, resulting in a transverse fracture of her first metatarsal on her left foot. Plaintiff brought an action sounding in negligence against Parkland Area School District (“the School District”), alleging that the negligent design and construction of the weight room provided Student with unfettered access to all of the equipment, which then caused her to sustain injuries. Plaintiff alleged that unfettered access to this weight room amounts to a design flaw because it is foreseeable that a weight would be stored improperly.
The School District filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that it was immune under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). While local government agencies are generally immune from tort liability under the PSTCA, there are exceptions. An injured party may recover when: (1) damages would otherwise be recoverable; (2) the injury was caused by a negligent act of the local agency or an employee acting within the scope of his/her official duties; and (3) the negligent act falls within an enumerated exception. One such exception, the real property exception, provides immunity for the care, custody or control of real property in the local agency’s possession, except in some instances involving trespassers. To recover under this exception, the plaintiff is required to show that the injury resulted from a dangerous condition that stemmed from the care, custody, or control of real property, not personalty.
Holding
Following a ruling by the Lower Court, an appeal was filed. On appeal, the Court considered whether to apply the Grieff approach or the Blocker approach, as both are used to determine whether the real property exception applies. Under the Grieff approach, the inquiry is whether the injury was caused by the care, custody or control of the real property itself. Under the Blocker approach, the inquiry is whether the injury was caused by personalty or a fixture. In the instant case, the Blocker approach was appropriate because Student was injured by a weight, which is an item of personalty that was merely on real property. The Court then determined that the real property exception did not apply because Plaintiff was not injured as a result of a negligently constructed or designed weight room, but rather was injured by personalty. The School District was immune from tort liability under the PSTCA because the real property exception did not apply.
Questions about this case can be directed to Kaylie O’Donnell at 717.255.7643 or kodonnell@tthlaw.com.
Farmers Fire Ins. Co. v. S.W. Krauss, LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
Nos. 731 MDA 2025, 736 MDA 2025
Decided: January 8, 2026
An affirmative defense raised in a new matter that is merely a legal conclusion without factual support does not create a dispute of material facts to preclude judgment on the pleadings.
Background
On January 1, 2023, while a patron of Club VIP, Malika Bell (“Bell”) was tragically struck in the head with a bullet after gunfire was exchanged during an altercation between unidentified individuals in the parking lot. Bell filed a Complaint asserting one count of negligence against the club and its owners and operators. Farmers Insurance provided a defense to the claims raised by Bell, but then filed a Declaratory Judgment Complaint, seeking a declaration that under the terms of its commercial liability policy, it did not have a duty to continue to defend and indemnify its insureds with respect to the claims made by Bell. Bell filed and Answer and New Matter, raising affirmative defenses to Farmers Insurance’s Declaratory Judgment Complaint.
In July of 2024, Farmers Insurance filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings and a supporting Brief, arguing that the policy’s assault and battery exclusion precluded coverage to the underlying Defendants for the negligence allegations that were raised by Bell. Bell filed a Response and Brief in opposition, arguing that the assault and battery exclusion did not preclude coverage. Bell argued that factual issues existed because Farmers Insurance failed to properly deny certain defenses raised by Bell and the underlying Defendants in their New Matters. After a ruling in favor of Farmers, an appeal was filed. Bell and the underlying Defendants argued that Bell has pled a claim for negligence and premises liability that is not excluded by the policy, while Farmers Insurance argued that any negligence alleged by Bell is still excluded by the policy because it arose out of an act of violence.
Holding
The Court noted that the interpretation of the insurance policy dictates whether the insurer has a duty to defend, citing past case law which states “[t]he language of the policy and the allegations of the complaint must be construed together to determine the insurers’ obligation.” The Court agreed with Farmers Insurance, holding that an affirmative defense raised in New Matter that is merely a legal conclusion without factual support does not create a dispute of material fact, and does not preclude judgment on the pleadings. The Court further held that due to the assault and battery exclusion, Farmers Insurance did not have a duty to defend its insureds against Bell’s underlying action.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at 717.255.7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Kennedy
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 276
Decided: December 11, 2025
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the “miscellaneous vehicle” exception in an insurance policy as a valid reason for denying uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits.
Background
In 2023, Elissa J. Kennedy was riding as a passenger on a motorcycle owned and operated by her husband, Dennis Kennedy. Both of the Kennedys were killed as the result of a single-vehicle crash. The motorcycle was insured by Progressive through a policy carrying $100,000 per person liability coverage, and $100,000 in “non-stacked” uninsured/underinsured (“UM/UIM”) motorist benefits. Dennis Kennedy was the only named insured on the Progressive Policy. The Estate of Elissa pursued a negligence claim against the Progressive Policy, which settled for the $100,000 liability limits. Thereafter, the Estate pursued a claim for UM/UIM coverage pursuant to a household auto policy provided by Erie Insurance. Erie denied the claim, arguing that the motorcycle fell within the “miscellaneous vehicle” exception to UM/UIM benefits. Erie brought an action for declaratory judgment, and the Trial Court affirmed Erie’s denial of coverage.
The miscellaneous vehicle exception specifically excludes from coverage any bodily injury to an insured using any non-owned miscellaneous vehicle, including a motorcycle. The Estate appealed the Trial Court’s decision, arguing that the miscellaneous vehicle exception is unenforceable as a matter of law as it acts as a “disguised waiver” of stacking coverages prohibited by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738. The Estate additionally argued that the exception was invalid due to ambiguities in the Erie Policy’s language. Specifically, the Estate argued the definition of “miscellaneous vehicles” as including motorcycles, and Erie’s exclusion of damages while occupying a miscellaneous vehicle not insured through the policy, were ambiguous terms and should accordingly be construed against Erie. Furthermore, the Estate argued that the motorcycle may instead be covered by the Erie Policy’s definition of an “owned motor vehicle.”
Holding
The Superior Court upheld the Trial Court’s holding. The Court reasoned that Section 1738 was not implicated in this matter, as the particular section requires that UM/UIM coverage be first recovered through another insurance policy. In this case, the decedent was not a named insured under the Progressive Policy, and therefore could not recover UM/UIM benefits from same. Accordingly, since there were no UM/UIM benefits to “stack,” Section 1738 was not implicated. The Court likewise found the Estate’s ambiguity argument unavailing, stating that there is no reasonable interpretation of the Erie Policy’s language which could be read as providing coverage to the motorcycle. The fact that the motorcycle was not included in the Erie Policy’s declaration page was dispositive, as was the fact that Elissa Kennedy was not the owner of the motorcycle.
Questions about this case can be directed to Danielle Schwartz at 717.237.7135 or dschwartz@tthlaw.com.
Poteat v. Asteak
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 277
Decided: December 11, 2025
The Superior Court reaffirms the application of the gist of the action doctrine.
Background
Plaintiff, Mr. Poteat, entered into a retainer agreement with Gary Asteak, Esq. and Nino V. Tinari, Esq. (Defendants), to provide legal services in a criminal matter. Plaintiff paid them each $7,500. After trial, Plaintiff was ultimately convicted and sentenced to five to ten years of incarceration. Plaintiff filed a Post Conviction Relief Act Petition, which the Trial Court granted on the grounds that Defendants provided ineffective representation. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants asserting their breach of the retainer agreement by failing to provide competent legal services. However, he failed to allege that the retainer agreement included an explicit provision that Defendants would provide competent legal services.
Defendants filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing that Plaintiff’s claim sounded in tort, not contract, and therefore was barred by the statute of limitations. The Trial Court sustained these Preliminary Objections by recasting Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as a tort claim, concluding that the statute of limitations barred the tort claim, and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.
Holding
The Superior Court applied an earlier holding by an en banc panel of the Court in Swatt v. Nottingham Village, which held that the gist of the action doctrine does not allow a trial court to convert a breach of contract claim into a tort claim and then dismiss the claim based on the statute of limitations. Simply put, the Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine did not apply to this case because Plaintiff pled a breach of contract claim when he alleged that Defendants breached the retainer agreement by failing to provide competent legal services. The Court accordingly reversed and remanded the matter.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at 610.332.7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Werner v. Beetel
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 156 MDA 2025
Decided: December 3, 2025
Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge regarding his condition in 2013, establishing inquiry notice and causing his two-year statute of limitations to run.
Background
Plaintiff Werner had a gallbladder removal surgery performed by Dr. Beetel in 2012. In December 2013, a CT scan revealed that Mr. Werner had a gallstone in his body. Plaintiff Werner’s new doctor communicated the existence of a gallstone to him in 2013, advising that the same could be responsible for his abdominal pain. Plaintiff Werner admitted: “Yes. I knew there was a [gall]stone.” The Court took judicial notice that gallstones are hardened deposits of digestive fluid that can form in your gallbladder. The Court noted the prerequisite of having a gallbladder in order for the human body to make gallstones is not subject to reasonable dispute.
Although Mr. Werner knew his body was still producing gallstones in 2013, he made no investigation into their cause. Instead, he waited until the summer of 2020 to sue Dr. Beetel and Surgical Institute of Reading for malpractice. At the close of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the Trial Court. The Trial Court determined that Plaintiff Werner’s malpractice claims were untimely because he had inquiry notice of his injury to start the statute of limitations clock as a matter of law. On appeal, Plaintiff Werner argued that the Trial Court erred because material issues of fact existed such that the discovery rule tolled the two-year statute of limitations.
Holding
The Court held that Mr. Werner’s action was time barred, applying the inquiry notice rule. Mr. Werner was subject to a two-year statute of limitations for the filing of his medical malpractice action. For the discovery rule to apply and toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must show the inability to know of the injury or its cause despite the exercise of due diligence. Even though Plaintiff Werner did not understand until 2018 that a part of his gallbladder remained inside his body, his production of post-surgery gallstones in 2013 provided him with inquiry notice to investigate and discover the injury that Dr. Beetel’s negligence caused him. Plaintiff Werner’s subjective lack of understanding of what his doctors told him did not toll the statute of limitations.
The Court noted that most other jurisdictions have adopted a more liberal view of the discovery rule, under which the statute of limitations commences when a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the cause of action associated with such harm, equating injury to legal injury. The Court, however, did not reach the issue of whether Pennsylvania should adopt the more liberal discovery rule over the inquiry notice rule, as that issue had not been properly preserved and was not advocated on appeal.
Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at 610.332.7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.