SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Penncrest Sch. Dist. v. Cagle
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 31 WAP 2023
Decided: August 19, 2025
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirms the only test to be utilized when determining whether disclosure of information is required under RTKL.
Background
While working for Penncrest, a third-party contractor was onsite at the high school when he noticed, and photographed, a display in the library containing approximately 70 books, several of which addressed LGBTQ+ issues, in anticipation of Pride Month. The photos were posted to Facebook. Two members of the Penncrest School Board shared the post to their personal Facebook pages and a local newspaper published an article entitled “Display of LGBTQ books at Maplewood draws debating comments on Facebook,” indicating that they had spoken with one of the board members who stated that he intended to bring the matter up at the next board meeting. Subsequently, a local resident, Thomas Cagle, submitted a Right to Know Law (“RTKL”) request to Penncrest seeking, amongst other things, disclosures of written correspondence of the Board Members, Facebook posts, and comments from the Board Members related to homosexuality and Penncrest.
Penncrest granted the request for emails from Penncrest-associated accounts. However, it denied all social media-related inquiries on the basis that no posts or comments existed on the Penncrest-owned Facebook accounts. The Trial Court found that the statements reflected the belief of a board member and thus created a public record subject to RTKL disclosure. The Commonwealth Court vacated the Trial Court’s decision and remanded with instructions, acknowledging that emails and social media are different methods of communication and because of this, opted to create its own analytical framework, setting forth several nonexclusive factors it believed should be considered when resolving whether a social media post was “of an agency” under the RTKL. The Court explained, inter alia, the necessity of reviewing the at-issue posts to discern “whether such posts prove, support, or evidence a transaction or activity of an agency.” The consideration thereafter is then whether the information at issue is created, received, or retained by public officials in their official capacity.
Holding
On appeal, the Supreme Court explained that the law’s clear and unambiguous language allows for the disclosure of all types of information, including, but not limited to, postings on digital platforms, if they are found to document a transaction or activity “of an agency, and were created received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the agency.” To determine if the information sought in this case was subject to disclosure, the Trial Court was required to consider whether the information (1) documented a transaction or activity of an agency, and (2) was created, received, or retained by an agency. The Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court in finding that the Trial Court was required, but failed, to consider a host of different factors when assessing whether the Facebook posts documented a transaction or activity “of an agency.”
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at 717.255.7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
DeWitt v. Bedford Cnty. Airport Auth.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
2025 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 613
Decided: November 10, 2025
Commonwealth Court affirmed a mistake by an entrant as to their status or permission to enter land does not relieve such entrant of trespasser status.
Background
Plaintiff Robert DeWitt was intending to meet an individual selling a trailer which had been listed online. Plaintiff followed Google Maps directions in an attempt to reach the seller’s location. The Plaintiff, however, ended up on premises owned by the Bedford County Airport Authority. The owners of Hochstelter Construction leased the premises as a residence, and Hochstelter Construction performed some back-office functions on the premises as well.
After arriving at the premises, Plaintiff knocked on the front door of the house. Receiving no answer, Plaintiff walked in the direction of a barn located on the premises. After to failing to locate anyone, Plaintiff slipped and fell on his way back to his vehicle. He sued the Airport Authority, as well as Hochstelter Construction. Following discovery, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, finding that Plaintiff was a trespasser.
Plaintiff appealed the Trial Court’s Order, arguing that he was a licensee when he entered the premises. He further contended that he was a licensee when he entered the premises, as he was seeking directions. He further contended the possessors were negligent by failing to clear the ice on which he allegedly slipped. Defendants argued that Plaintiff was not seeking directions, but rather, was mistakenly on the premises. Defendants maintained that the Plaintiff was a trespasser and, as such, liability could only be found if the Defendants had engaged in wanton or willful misconduct.
Holding
The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order. A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land by virtue of the possessor’s consent. No such consent existed in this instance. Furthermore, a mistake by an entrant as to their status or permission to enter land does not relieve such entrant of trespasser status. The proper standard of care owed to Plaintiff as a trespasser was that Defendants would not injure him with wanton or willful misconduct. Plaintiff pleaded only negligence and did not allege any wanton or willful misconduct on the part of the Defendants. Moreover, the record did not support a finding of wanton or willful misconduct. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at 267.746.1808 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.
L.B. v. Leechburg Area Sch. Dist.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 1156 CD 2023
Decided: October 20, 2025
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirms Trial Court Order overruling Defendant school district’s assertion of governmental immunity raised via Preliminary Objections.
Background
This action arose out of an incident of student-on-student sexual assault at an after-school program. As of November 2021, both minor Plaintiff E.C. and an unidentified male student perpetrator were enrolled in the after-school program. During one of the sessions, the perpetrator lured E.C. into the men’s room and proceeded to sexually assault her. E.C. claimed negligence, asserting that the school had a duty to supervise all students participating in the after-school program, which it allegedly breached by failing to monitor the hallways and attendance at the program.
The District filed Preliminary Objections, asserting, among other grounds, immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act because no statute requires a school district to monitor its hallways or search for students missing from after-school programs. Plaintiff filed Preliminary Objections to the District’s Preliminary Objections, arguing that the District’s assertion of immunity was premature. Both Preliminary Objections were heard together, with the immunity issue being decided against the District without prejudice to its ability to raise it again in its Answer.
Holding
Considering the distinct purposes of Preliminary Objections and New Matter included in Answers to Complaints, the Commonwealth Court ruled that Preliminary Objections cannot be used to assert affirmative defenses. The requirement that Courts consider all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true when considering Preliminary Objections prevents the Court from considering at the Preliminary Objection phase any kind of challenge to Plaintiff’s version of the facts. Here, the facts, as asserted by E.C., stated that a student-on-student sexual assault was foreseeable and that the District failed to prevent it which, for purposes of the Preliminary Objections, had to be accepted as true. E.C’s factual allegations met the requirements for a negligence claim because public entities are, in fact, liable for the violation of a common-law duty. Therefore, E.C.’s Complaint survived the District’s Preliminary Objections.
Questions about this case can be directed to Charles Nutaitis at 610.332.7020 or cnutaitis@tthlaw.com.
Vargas v. United Modular Enters.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 396 EDA 2025
Decided: November 13, 2025
Failure to attempt service until 5 months after expiration of statute of limitations was not good faith attempt at service, regardless of Defendant’s actual notice.
Background
This case arises out of a February 20, 2019 motor vehicle accident whereby Plaintiff was injured by vehicles owned/operated by Defendants. Plaintiff brought suit by Complaint filed on February 12, 2021. No attempt was made at service until July 2021, despite counsel for Plaintiff entering an appearance on the date the Complaint was filed. After several sporadic attempts at service by sheriff, service was made by posting on February 27, 2022, more than a year after the Complaint was filed, and after the statute of limitations had expired.
Defendants filed Preliminary Objections, which were ultimately sustained on the basis that Plaintiff improperly attempted service, such that the statute of limitations was not tolled. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Superior Court.
Holding
The Superior Court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit on the basis that Plaintiff failed to timely effect service and failed to make a good faith effort to complete service prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants were on actual notice of the suit was not relevant, as actual notice is only considered where it is the result of “improper but diligent” attempts at service, and where the party attempting service has not evinced an intent to stall the judicial machinery. Herein, there was no service attempted for more than 5 months. The case supports the proposition that even short delays at attempting service, after the expiration of the statute of limitations, can support complete dismissal of an action.
Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at 610.332.7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.
Ojo v. Hanover Foods Corp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2037 EDA 2024
Decided: September 25, 2025
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that venue in Philadelphia County was improper because Hanover Foods did not regularly conduct business there, and its use of the Port of Philadelphia and indirect retail sales through third-party distributors were insufficient to satisfy Pennsylvania’s venue requirements.
Background
In January 2024, Plaintiff Ojo filed a Complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence, strict liability, wrongful death and survival. The action was filed against Defendants Hanover Foods Corporation and related entities in connection with a defective bean hopper machine at Hanover Foods’ facility in York County, which caused Plaintiff’s decedent’s death. The Complaint asserted that all Defendants regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County and, therefore, venue was proper. Defendant Hanover Foods filed Preliminary Objections, asserting that Philadelphia County was an improper venue because the company did not regularly conduct business in that county. Defendants Duravant LLC and Key Technology, Inc. also filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that Philadelphia County was an improper venue for the case.
The period of discovery revealed that Hanover Foods’ role in Philadelphia was limited to the importation of raw vegetables through the Philadelphia Port, where third-party vendors carry out the importation and transportation to big-box retailers to sell in Philadelphia stores after receiving the goods from distribution centers located outside the county. Ojo asserted that Hanover Foods derived revenue and engaged with Philadelphia suppliers. However, the nature of those relationships and quantity of those activities were minimal. Only 0.007% of Defendant Key Technology’s total revenue from sales in Pennsylvania over a similar time period resulted from this relationship. The Trial Court sustained the Preliminary Objections and found that Hanover Foods did not “regularly conduct business” in Philadelphia County and thus, transferred venue to York County.
Holding
The Superior Court held that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Hanover Foods’ Preliminary Objections and transferring the case from Philadelphia County to York County for improper venue. The Superior Court emphasized venue is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(d)(1) and is based on whether a defendant regularly conducts business in the county where the suit is filed, which is dependent on quantitative and qualitative contacts. Quality acts are essential to the entity’s business objective and incidental acts are not sufficient to meet the quality aspect of the test. The Court concluded that the importation of raw vegetables through the port of Philadelphia did not constitute quality contacts. Hanover Foods had no physical presence or direct sales to satisfy the venue standard in Philadelphia County. The purchase of goods from suppliers in Philadelphia is not sufficient to meet the standard of regularly conducting business in the county.
Questions about this case can be directed to Rachel Chan at 610.332.7012 or rchan@tthlaw.com.