SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 93 MAP 2023
Decided: April 25, 2025
Supreme Court affirms Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act does not require a written request for a voluntary admission.
Background
In January 2011, Westley Wise was experiencing a profound mental health crisis that unfortunately led to the murder of Jessica Frederick, who shared an apartment with Wise. Wise’s mental health struggles date back to his early childhood that were exacerbated by the use of alcohol and elicit substances. Wise’s mental health and substance abuse led him to “snap” and stab his then live-in girlfriend in 2007. He was subsequently diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Wise served a 21-month sentence in jail for simple assault. By mid-January 2011, Wise again was experiencing a mental health crisis, so much so that on January 21, 2011 he became suicidal and called an ambulance to be transported to Geisinger. Wise reported feeling like he was going to snap and requested to stay in the hospital, just as he had previously. Geisinger determined he was not “bad enough to stay.”
Wise then presented to Alley Medical Center, where his family doctor was on staff. He lodged the same complaints and added that he was experiencing hallucinations. He was given a refill for his prescription and was sent home. Wise then returned to his apartment, and later that evening, stabbed Jessica to death and attempted to end his own life. Subsequently, in August 2013, Administrator filed this action under Section 114(a) of the MHPA against Geisinger, Alley, and the individual medical personnel who were involved in the diagnoses and treatment of Wise, alleging they engaged in gross negligence and/or willful misconduct in denying Wise’s requests for inpatient treatment. Defendants sought summary judgment.
Holding
This matter came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after an order denying summary judgment. The Court was to interpret various provisions of the MHPA. Section 114(a) has been construed to create an affirmative duty requiring mental health professionals and institutions to avoid willful misconduct or gross negligence in the treatment of mental health patients and imposes civil liability for a breach of that duty. The MHPA specifically distinguishes between voluntary inpatient treatment (Sections 201-207) and involuntary inpatient treatment (Sections 301-306). Here, Wise presented on his own volition to seek treatment. No section of the MPHA mandates that an individual seeking voluntary inpatient treatment at such facilities apply in writing. Consequently, the Court held that the liability imposed by Section 114(a) arose upon Wise’s request for admission.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Simone v. Alam
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 35 MDA 2024
Decided: March 20, 2025
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirms that a tenant in common who did not exercise possession or control over a subject property is not an indispensable party in a premises liability action.
Background
Plaintiff resident in a multi-tenant building slipped and fell on ice in the common area and sustained injury. She filed a premises liability action against Defendant Alam, asserting that he “owned, possessed, maintained, controlled and/or had the right to control” the premises and had a duty to oversee its common areas. Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint, admitting he was the owner but denied as conclusions of law the averment regarding possession and control. Eventually, owner filed a Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party, specifically his brother (“Brother”). As Brother was a joint owner of the premises at the time of the injury, Defendant maintained he was an indispensable party and the failure to join Brother before the statute of limitations expired deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff argued that Brother was not indispensable, according to the factors identified in Pennsylvania case law because he did not have a right or interest in the claim and justice could be afforded without violating his due process rights. Plaintiff maintained she did not have to join the Brother because Defendant, as possessor of the property, was liable for her damages. Brother was not on the lease, was not a landlord collecting rent, and was not in control of the premises. Plaintiff argued that Brother was a landlord out of possession who hand no interest in the action because he was not liable for the possessor’s negligence, and the case would not affect his title in the property. The Trial Court agreed with Defendant pursuant to a nearly 80-year old-case, Minner v. City of Pittsburgh, in which the Supreme Court stated that “the liability for the negligence complained of having grown out of ownership of real estate held by tenants in common, all three owners are required to be joined.” The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s conclusion.
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Lower Courts erred in applying Minner to this case and concluding that Plaintiff’s claims arose, in part, out of Defendant’s ownership of the premises. Reading the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted a premises liability action against Defendant for breaching his duty to her, as his invitee and tenant, to maintain safe conditions on the property and to remedy dangerous conditions that he could have discovered through reasonable care. Plaintiff’s specific allegations of negligence did not relate to Defendant’s mere ownership of the premises but to his actions in possessing, controlling, and maintaining the premises. As the potential liability arises out of Defendant’s status as a possessor of land and a landlord, not as a mere owner, the Lower Courts incorrectly concluded that the co-owner of the property who was not in possession or control of it was an indispensable party. Therefore, Brother, as tenant in common, was not an indispensable party in the premises liability action.
Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.
Penn Entm’t, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1237
Decided: May 7, 2025
Pennsylvania Superior Court upholds the rulings of Ungarean and Scranton Club, finding no coverage for purely economic losses caused by the COVID-19 shutdowns under policies requiring “physical damage.”
Background
Penn Entertainment, Inc. and its subsidiaries, challenged a denial of its claims for insurance coverage benefits for economic loss it incurred as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Penn Entertainment alleged that they suffered losses due to forced closures by the Gaming Control Board and civil authorities. The coverage was denied on the basis that the policies required “direct physical loss or damage” to the insured property. Penn initiated a declaratory judgement action which was dismissed when the Trial Court granted the insurers’ Motions for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Superior Court sought to determine if the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgement for the insurers. During briefing for the appeal of the summary judgement Orders, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania passed down the ruling in Ungarean, which found a dentist was not entitled to coverage because his covered business properties did not sustain any direct physical loss or damage. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the sole reason for the insured’s financial losses during the policy period was the government-ordered shutdown due to COVID-19, which prevented him from operating his insured properties at their full potential. The Court interpreted this, and later case law of a similar ilk, finding no coverage for these losses incurred as a result of COVID-19.
Holding
The Superior Court found that Penn incurred purely economic losses because the government ordered shutdowns due to COVID-19 temporarily prevented Penn from operating its covered properties. These closures involved no physical damage for purposes of a commercial property insurance policy, and therefore the Trial Court did not err in granting the Motions for summary judgment of the insurers.
Questions about this case can be directed to Michael Moran at (267) 861-7598 or mmoran@tthlaw.com.
Green v. Farole
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 84
Decided: April 14, 2025
Actual notice of a lawsuit to a defendant is not sufficient if good faith efforts of rule-based service are not made.
Background
Plaintiff’s counsel filed a dental malpractice lawsuit on April 27, 2023, exactly two years after Plaintiff claimed to learn of the underlying alleged negligence. As part of Plaintiff’s counsel’s filing, they forwarded the Complaint and payment to the sheriff’s office for service. Approximately 43 days later, on June 9, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel had the Complaint reinstated. On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel received notice from the sheriff’s office that the Complaint had never been served due to errors in the submission to the sheriff’s office. The Complaint was then reinstated on the same day. The Defendant was served via private process server on July 10, 2023, but was never ultimately served by the sheriff. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint arguing that service was improper and that the Complaint should be dismissed given the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Trial Court sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.
Holding
The Superior Court found that the Trial Court did not commit error or an abuse of discretion in its ruling and affirmed the dismissal. The Superior Court reasoned that in light of the Defendant never being served via sheriff, the act of not following up with the sheriff’s office to confirm service after more than two months was not considered to be diligent by the Plaintiff.
Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.
Mendoza-Colon v. Luscomb, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 83
Decided: April 10, 2025
The Trial Court abused its discretion by sustaining Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to venue without allowing discovery on the issue of whether the Defendant corporation regularly conducted business in Luzerne County.
Background
Plaintiff Yesenia Mendoza-Colon initiated the underlying action via a Complaint in Luzerne County, alleging negligence against Defendants Gary’s Furniture and Luscomb, Inc. Defendants filed Preliminary Objections to venue. Defendants argued that venue in Luzerne County was improper as Defendants did not regularly conduct business there, and their principle and only place of business was in Lycoming County. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants’ website advertised that it delivered within 50 miles, including areas of Luzerne County.
Following oral argument, the Trial Court sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to venue and transferred the case to Lycoming County. Plaintiff appealed the Trial Court’s transfer of venue, arguing the Trial Court abused its discretion by transferring venue without allowing a period of discovery to enable her to determine the quantity and quality of contacts Defendants had in Luzerne County.
Holding
The Superior Court vacated the Trial Court’s Order transferring venue to Lycoming County and remanded the case for further proceedings, including discovery on the issue of whether the Defendant corporation regularly conducted business in Luzerne County. The Trial Court reasoned that Defendants’ assertion that it did not conduct business in Luzerne County was a legal conclusion, not a factual averment. Plaintiff’s evidence regarding Defendant’s website advertising delivery services within 50 miles, including Luzerne County, raised a factual issue as to whether Defendant regularly conducted business in Luzerne County that was essential to its corporate purpose of selling furniture. As such, the Trial Court was required under the rules to allow discovery on this factual issue before ruling on the Preliminary Objections to venue.
Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.
Wingate v. McGrath
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2879 EDA 2023, 2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 948
Decided: April 10, 2025
The Court rules Plaintiffs waived objection to expert testimony and reversed an Order granting a new trial and remanded for entry of judgment.
Background
This action stems from a motor vehicle accident in which Defendant struck Plaintiffs, allegedly causing disc herniations at L2-3 and L3-4, as well as cervical strain and sprain. An arbitration panel found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding $40,000 in damages. Defendant timely appealed, demanding a jury trial.
Defendant produced two expert reports from a radiologist and offered video testimony. Plaintiffs filed a Motion in limine to exclude the radiologist from testifying to the cause of the disc herniations, arguing that there was no scientific evidence supporting the radiologist’s opinion. The Court ordered that the Motion in limine would be decided at the time of trial. Defendant’s radiologist’s testimony was then played via videotape on the second day of trial. Plaintiffs did not request a ruling on the Motion in limine to exclude the evidence at any time prior to the playing of the testimony. Plaintiffs only reminded the Trial Court of the Motion in limine after the entire tape was shown. The Trial Court responded that it was “too little, too late” to raise the Motion after the video testimony. Per the court, the proper time for a lawyer to bring up an issue to be decided at trial is before the witness testifies, not after.
On September 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed timely Post-Trial Motions requesting a new trial, the sole basis being the Trial Court’s failure to rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion in limine to exclude the video testimony. On October 2, 2023, Defendant filed an Answer opposing Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Motions, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to re-raise the issue prior to the showing of the video testimony. Without ordering Briefs or oral argument, the Court entered an Order on October 4, 2023, granting Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Motions and ordering a new trial. On November 2, 2023, Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to that Order.
Holding
Plaintiffs argued that the Trial Court did not properly rule on the Motion in limine because it failed to conduct a Snizavich analysis. However, the Superior Court held that the Trial Court failed to conduct the Snizavich analysis, not because it was derelict in its duty, but because Plaintiffs failed to renew the issue prior to the presentation of the video testimony. The Superior Court noted that Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have made it clear that “if the trial court defers ruling on a motion in limine until trial, the party that brought the motion must renew the objection at trial or the issue will be deemed waived on appeal.”
The Superior Court held that Plaintiffs’ failure to renew the objection to the use of the videotape constituted a waiver of the objection. The Superior Court then reversed the Order granting a new trial because the use of the videotape was Plaintiffs’ only argument.
Questions about this case can be directed to Trevor Flynn at (717) 255-7239 or tflynn@tthlaw.com.
Harris v. Felouzis
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 85 WDA 2023, 333 A.3d 919
Decided: February 10, 2025
Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that a condition can be unreasonably dangerous even if it is not visibly defective.
Background
Defendant purchased a large residential property that included a densely wooded slope which abutted a busy, four-lane highway. Defendant never visited the sloped-portion of the property. Defendant also never stopped to inspect the slope while driving on the highway, nor did she hire a professional landscaper to inspect the slope. However, Defendant did observe fallen tree branches laying on the hillside. One day, an oak tree located on the slope collapsed and landed on top of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff brought a negligence claim against the landowner on the basis that the tree was an unreasonably dangerous condition. At trial, Defendant moved for compulsory nonsuit based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the tree was defective prior to the accident. Defendant argued that, if the tree was not defective, the tree could not constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition as a matter of law. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s Motion because whether the condition was dangerous was a question of fact for the jury.
Holding
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The Court reasoned that a landowner is in a better position to recognize the dangerous condition of a tree on the landowner’s property than a passing motorist. The Court observed: “The seriousness of the danger would require the factfinder to consider such things as the location of the tree relative to the highway, its height, its age, the topography on which it grows, and other pertinent characteristics.” Ultimately, the Court concluded that the jury was free to infer that Defendant unreasonably allowed the oak tree to grow on a steep hill, overlooking a busy, urban highway, despite Plaintiff failing to produce any evidence showing the oak tree was visibly defective.
President Judge Emeritus Bender set forth a persuasive dissent, opining that “the reasonably-prudent test asks what that person would do in connection with known or knowable risks.” Therefore, a defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge that the tree at issue was somehow defective. Judge Bender believed that no duty would arise if the tree at issue was otherwise healthy and the accident was caused by a random force of nature. Accordingly, since the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, Judge Bender would require some showing that the tree was defective before liability attaches to a defendant. However, Judge Bender’s viewpoint was explicitly rejected by the majority opinion and is not binding law.
Questions about this case can be directed to Adam Kleiber at (717) 237-7157 or akleiber@tthlaw.com.