SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 58 EAP 2024
Decided: January 21, 2026
Order compelling arbitration and staying trial proceedings was not an immediately appealable collateral order.
Background
Plaintiffs filed suit naming Uber, among others, for injuries sustained when an Uber driver allegedly made an aggressive turn causing Shannon Chilutti to fall out of a wheelchair, striking her head. In response, Uber filed a Petition to compel arbitration, arguing that when the Chiluttis enrolled in Uber, they agreed to arbitrate the claims presented in their Complaint. The Trial Court granted the Petition compelling arbitration and stayed court proceedings pending the results of the arbitration. Plaintiffs appealed, maintaining that the Trial Court’s Order constituted an immediately appealable collateral order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Plaintiffs argued that the Trial Court erred in granting Uber’s Petition. A divided en banc panel of the Superior Court reversed and remanded, determining that it had jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal and that the parties did not have a valid arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted Uber’s Petition for allowance of appeal addressing the issue of whether the Superior Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to immediately review an interlocutory order staying litigation pending arbitration. The Supreme Court noted that the Trial Court’s Order was not a final order that disposed of all claims and all parties. Analyzing Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, the Court stated that the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed and each of the three prongs of the standard must be clearly present. The Supreme Court determined that the Trial Court’s Order was not an immediately appealable collateral order. The Court further reasoned that if the Chiluttis are later aggrieved by the final judgment that is entered after the matter is returned to the Trial Court following the arbitration, they can appeal that judgment to the Superior Court.
Holding
The Trial Court’s Order granting the Petition to compel arbitration of ongoing litigation does not qualify as a collateral order, and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim that the parties lacked a valid arbitration agreement.
Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.
Erie Ins. Exch. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 19 WAP 2024
Decided: January 21, 2026
Pennsylvania Supreme Court limits recovery for insurer who files suit as subrogee to that which is available under its insureds’ policy.
Background
A fire at Bates Collision, Inc. resulted in damage to several cars stored therein. Erie, the insurer for the shop and the vehicles inside, paid over $1.6 million in damages. Its policy contained a provision which entitled Erie to seek reimbursement for such payment from anyone else held responsible. USAA insured the vehicle which was suspected to have caused the fire. By the time Erie had requested that USAA take steps to preserve it for investigation, the car had been towed and stored. Subsequently, the entity which towed and stored the vehicle sold it at a salvage auction. Erie filed suit as subrogee of its insureds, making a promissory estoppel claim against USAA.
Holding
As a subrogee for its insureds, Erie’s rights to recovery were limited to the damages for which it paid its insureds under the policy. Erie did not have a viable claim against USAA for hindering its investigation by failing to preserve a vehicle because that loss was distinct from the loss caused by the fire. The Court declined to opine on the viability of a promissory estoppel claim by a carrier against a party who fails to preserve evidence which interferes with the insurer’s pursuit of subrogation rights. Critically, the Court emphasized that Erie’s self-proclaimed status as subrogee limited its right to recovery for the loss outlined in the policy.
Questions about this case can be directed to Caitlyn Corey at 267.817.7024 or ccorey@tthlaw.com.
Gidor v. Mangus
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 21 WAP 2024
Decided: October 23, 2025
Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law includes a statute of repose commanding that an action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.
Background
In May 2017, Mary Gidor entered into an agreement to purchase a home in Titusville, Pennsylvania. Gidor orally agreed with Benjamin E. Mangus that he would perform a home inspection of the property. On June 6, 2017, Mangus delivered to Gidor his home inspection report for the property, which did not disclose any problems with the property’s structural components or foundation. Relying on the same, Gidor purchased the home. Thereafter, during the winter of 2018-2019, a water pipe in the property froze and burst beneath the primary bathroom.
In August 2019, Gidor filed a Complaint against Mangus alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law, breach of contract, and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law. In his New Matter, Mangus relied on Section 7512 of the Home Inspection Law, averring that Gidor failed to file the lawsuit within one year of the delivery of the inspection report. The trial Court held that Section 7512 was ambiguous, noting that Gidor interpreted it as a statute of limitations, while Mangus interpreted it as a statute of repose. The Superior Court reversed. Gidor timely appealed.
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the text of Section 7512 is plain and unambiguous in commanding that an action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered. Further, the Court held that Section 7512 is a statute of repose.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at 610.332.7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Hernandez v. Zook
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 560 MDA 2025
Decided: January 6, 2026
Avoiding a future lawsuit is not a cause for current tardiness; stalling another’s case by your own delay is prejudice; and counsel’s ignorance of a new law is not a valid excuse under Pennsylvania law.
Background
In a defamation case, Sharon Zook (“Zook”) was denied entry of a Special Motion to dismiss or for entry of judgment due to the untimeliness of Zook’s Motion. According to Zook, she sent an email to the Lebanon County Commissioners and the County Solicitor. The email concerned Luis Hernandez (“Hernandez”), who owns various senior-care businesses in Lebanon County. Zook’s email accused Hernandez of violating Pennsylvania laws and abusing elderly patients in his nursing homes. It was further claimed that Hernandez had lawsuits and charges against him for failing to report taxes, and that complaints against the nursing home were being forwarded to the city where Hernandez had an agent protecting him due to Hernandez being part of an organized crime network and trafficking undocumented immigrants. Zook implored the recipients of the email to do something about Hernandez.
After learning about the email, Hernandez sued Zook for defamation per se, where he sought over $50,000 in damages and an injunction to stop Zook from making further claims that he was a criminal. After being served, Zook filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurer, which Hernandez opposed. While the Preliminary Objections were pending, Zook filed a Special Motion to dismiss or for entry of judgment under the UPEPA. Zook conceded that her Motion was untimely because she had not made her Motion within the 60-day period as mandated. However, Zook contended that her time for bringing the Motion should be extended to for “good cause.” Zook argued: (1) reaching the merits of the Special Motion would avoid the need for her to file a separate action against Hernandez under 42 Pa.C.S.A § 8320.1; (2) neither party would suffer prejudice, because the matter was still in the pleading stages; (3) UPEPA was very recently enacted, hence Zook’s counsel only recently learning of its passage; and (4) allowing an untimely filing would be consistent with the General Assembly’s mandate of broad construction of UPEPA under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.12(4).
Holding
The Court held that eliminating a potential future lawsuit was not good cause for an untimely filing in this action. Indeed, per the Court, the same was not a “cause” of Zook’s untimeliness at all, and how she may elect to proceed in the future cannot possibly have caused her tardiness in the present. The Court then stated that as the party seeking dismissal of the lawsuit, her lack of prejudice is irrelevant. Hernandez, on the other hand, has suffered a great deal of prejudice from the untimely Motion, as he has watched his case stagnate for over a year, while the Special Motion and a subsequent interlocutory appeal were heard. The Court stated that Zook’s untimely Motion brought the wheels of justice to a grinding halt. While Zook admitted that her Motion was untimely, she stated that her attorney’s ignorance of the new law was a viable excuse for not filing the Special Motion within 60 days. The Court quoted case law stating that for nearly two centuries, courts have held that ignorance of the law is not an excuse to any person, be that civilly or criminally. The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision to deny the Special Motion under the UPEPA.
Questions about this case can be directed to Zoe Wilson at 717.255.7231 or zwilson@tthlaw.com.
Amagasu v. Mitsubishi Motors N.A.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3226
Decided: December 22, 2025
The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacates a near one billion dollar verdict in a crashworthiness case due to erroneous instructions given to the jury by the Trial Judge.
Background
The Plaintiff, Soomi Amagasu, on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband Francis Amagasu, sued Mitsubishi Motors and others following a catastrophic roll over motor vehicle accident in which Mr. Amagasu was rendered a quadriplegic. She alleged that the occupant restraint system of the vehicle was defective. Prior to trial, the parties disputed whether the Trial Court was required to instruct the jury on the so-called “crashworthiness doctrine,” a subset of product liability applicable to situations where the defective product did not cause the accident but, served to increase the injury. Mitsubishi asked the Trial Court to instruct the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine, while the Plaintiff asked the Court to instruct the jury in accordance with the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions for general strict liability. The Trial Court sided with the Plaintiff and did not instruct the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine. The jury found for the Plaintiff, awarding $156 million in compensatory damages for Mr. Amagasu, $20 million in damages to Mrs. Amagasu for loss of consortium, and $800 million in punitive damages. Mitsubishi appealed the judgment on several grounds, including the Court’s failure to charge the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine.
Holding
On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the jury’s verdict, holding that the Trial Court had “abdicated its duty” to instruct the jury on correct legal principals. Specifically, the Court noted that the Plaintiff, from the initial pleadings through proofs offered at trial, was clearly pursuing a crashworthiness case, which imposes a more demanding standard of proof than a traditional product liability action. The crashworthiness doctrine is a subset of design defect product liability law that arises (usually in the context of a vehicular accident) where the alleged defect did not cause the accident, but allegedly increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the design defect. Plaintiffs in such cases must prove the existence of an alternative, safer design, and show how the alleged defect contributed to their injuries beyond those that were unavoidable, elements which are not ordinarily required in a traditional product liability action. The Court found that the Trial Court’s decision to follow its “normal policy” of instructing the jury only as set out in the Suggested Standard Jury Instructions (SSJI) – which do not contain a crashworthiness instruction – improperly outsourced its discretion to a secondary legal source that has been held “not conclusive, but merely a guide.” Since the SSJI instructions do not sufficiently cover the crashworthiness doctrine, the Superior Court vacated the verdict and ordered a new trial.
Questions about this case can be directed to Kenneth T. Newman at 412.926.1425 or knewman@tthlaw.com.
Swank v. Rabkin Dermatopathology Lab.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 342 WDA 2025
Decided: December 15, 2025
The Superior Court, in an unpublished decision, affirms holding of Spencer, wherein it was determined that the Fair Share Act does not apply to cases where the plaintiff is not negligent.
Background
This case arises out of alleged medical malpractice related to a failure to diagnose Thomas Swank with squamous cell carcinoma, which ultimately caused his death. Several doctors had examined a wound on Mr. Swank’s hand over a long period of time, with several biopsies being performed, before the correct diagnosis was made. Mr. Swank’s estate sued several of the medical providers who allegedly failed to correctly diagnose Mr. Swank. His estate settled with several of the providers, but went to trial against two non-settling providers. Despite the absence of any expert reports from either side implicating the settled Defendants, and despite the joint-tortfeasor releases releasing the settled Defendants, the settled Defendants remained on the verdict slip over the objections of both Plaintiff and the settled Defendants. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the non-settling medical providers. Plaintiff appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court found that the settled Defendants were improperly included on the verdict sheet. First, and most importantly, the Superior Court disagreed with the argument that the settled defendants were necessary on the verdict sheet for apportionment of liability under the Fair Share Act. The Court stated, relying on Spencer, that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases where the Plaintiff’s negligence is not at issue. Further, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act did not apply. There was no evidence, from any party, to implicate the settled Defendants. As such, they should not have appeared on the verdict sheet.
Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at 610.332.7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.