SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Rosamilia v. Alaska Air Cargo
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 193
Decided: September 3, 2025
The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of an action for breach of contract, finding that the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County properly granted Defendant’s Preliminary Objections based on improper venue.
Background
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, Alaska Air Cargo (“Alaska Air”), for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”). Plaintiff paid to ship an outboard motor and other products through Alaska Air. Due to the classification of the motor as “dangerous,” Alaska Air was unable to ship the item and did not charge Plaintiff shipping fees related to the motor. Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, filed suit against Alaska Air in Pennsylvania. Alaska Air objected to the venue and averred that Plaintiff was bound by the Alaska Air Cargo Domestic Conditions of Contract (“the carriage contract”), which specifically provides the parties consented to exclusive jurisdiction and venue of state and federal courts situated in King County, Washington. During oral argument and over Plaintiff’s objection, Alaska Air also argued that the traditional improper forum analysis, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 2179, applied, including the Court’s analysis of the quantity and quality of contacts with the forum. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the Court sustained Alaska Air’s Preliminary Objections to venue.
Plaintiff challenged the Trial Court’s ruling on the basis that the Court considered issues outside of the scope of the forum selection clause; namely, that it allowed Alaska Air to argue that it did not have the sufficient quality or quantity of contacts with Pennsylvania required by Rule 2179.
Holding
The Superior Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision that a fair reading of Alaska Air’s Preliminary Objections included arguments related to Rule 2179. Thus, the Trial Court committed no error in considering the factors related to Rule 2179 when it dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice.
Questions about this case can be directed to Sarah Cobbs at (412) 926-1447 or scobbs@tthlaw.com.
Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Venue Servs., LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 3125 EDA 2024
Decided: August 27, 2025
Plaintiff’s suit was dismissed for lack of “good faith effort” to serve Complaint.
Background
In a breach-of-contract case, Plaintiff, Ohio Security Insurance, Co. (“Ohio”), alleged that Defendant, Pinnacle Venue Services, LLC, (“Pinnacle”), breached workers’ compensation contracts by failing to pay premiums. It was alleged that Ohio first discovered this alleged breach on May 20, 2019, following an audit. Ohio waited until May 17, 2023 to file a Complaint for breach of contract in Philadelphia County. Ohio’s attorneys were with Burton Neil & Associates, P.C. Around the time the Complaint was filed, Burton Neil & Associates closed. Based on this closing, the attorney for Ohio found another firm to take over this case in August 2023.
Importantly, neither Ohio, nor its attorneys at Burton Neil & Associates, made any attempt to serve original process on Pinnacle. Additionally, no Praecipe to reinstate the Complaint was made until August 2023, when the new firm was involved. In September 2023, a process server delivered the reinstated Complaint to Pinnacle, a permitted method of service in Philadelphia County. Pinnacle filed Preliminary Objections, including an objection based on improper and untimely service of process. Initially, the Trial Court overruled the Preliminary Objections. Pinnacle then moved for reconsideration. Relying on Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie Corporation, the Trial Court granted reconsideration, sustained the Preliminary Objection based on untimely service of process, and dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice. Ohio timely appealed.
Holding
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and subsequent case law, including Ferraro, Plaintiffs must establish that they made “good faith” attempts to effectuate service during the allotted period. The Ferraro “good faith effort” analysis controls the present matter. Ferraro stands for the proposition that, when a plaintiff files a lawsuit, the plaintiff must make immediate and repeated attempts to perfect original service of process. Here, Ohio simply filed the Complaint and allowed it to lapse for over two months without trying to serve original process. Despite raising the argument that this lack of effort was due to the firm’s closing, the Superior Court was not persuaded by this as firms close “all of the time.”
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Hernandez v. Independence Constr. Corp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1911 EDA 2023
Decided: August 18, 2025
Superior Court addresses whether ICC, general contractor on a SEPTA project, qualified as the narrowly construed statutory employer of a subcontractor’s employee who was injured on the job.
Background
Plaintiff was working in a trench near active SEPTA tracks when he was severely injured by a train. He collected workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer, but also filed a negligence suit against ICC, arguing that ICC failed to follow industry standards such as posting watchpersons and closing tracks. ICC attempted to invoke the statutory employer doctrine under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”), which grants a contractor immunity from tort liability if it qualifies as a statutory employer under the law. The Trial Court disagreed with ICC’s argument, and a jury rendered a verdict determining all Defendants were liable. ICC appealed and, among non-related evidentiary issues, argued that the Trial Court erred in determining it was not a statutory employer under the WCA. Specifically, ICC argued that it enjoyed statutory employer immunity on two separate grounds: (1) the Excavation Exception under Section 302(a) of the WCA, arguing that the job of “trenching” qualified as “excavation” under the WCA, which would automatically create a contractor-subcontractor relationship; and (2) that it was in “control of the premises” pursuant to the McDonald v. Levinson Steel test and Section 302(b) of the WCA.
Holding
On appeal, the Superior Court analyzed these two arguments and ultimately affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. First, as it relates to ICC’s first argument under Section 302(a) of the WCA, the Court rejected this broad interpretation of the statute, holding that “excavation” should be narrowly construed in its technical construction sense. As Plaintiff’s work was determined to be deemed “digging” at trial, this could not be considered “excavation” under the WCA.
Next, the Superior Court analyzed ICC’s contention that it maintained control of the premises on which Plaintiff was injured. However, the Court again disagreed with ICC’s interpretation of the long-standing McDonald v. Levinson Steel test, which requires that five elements must be satisfied for statutory employer status: (1) a contract with an owner; (2) premises occupied by or under the control of the contractor; (3) a subcontract; (4) work that is part of the contractor’s regular business; and (5) injury to a subcontractor’s employee. If satisfied, the contractor is liable for workers’ compensation benefits, but immune from negligence suits. The Superior Court determined that the meaning of “occupation or control” must be strictly construed and the evidence at trial did not indisputably establish that ICC is entitled to judgment pursuant to Section 302(b) of the WCA.
As ICC failed to meet the statutory employer test, it was not Plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus did not enjoy tort immunity and the jury verdict was upheld. The decision confirms that the statutory employer doctrine will be applied narrowly in Pennsylvania. ICC could not claim statutory employer immunity because it did not establish that it engaged in true “excavation” work under the WCA, nor that it occupied or controlled the worksite under the McDonald test. As a result, the Plaintiff in this matter was permitted to pursue both workers’ compensation benefits from his employer and a civil action against ICC.
Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.