SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
White v. McGill
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 186 CD 2024
Decided: June 30, 2025
Commonwealth Court reinforces that public agencies, such as SEPTA (and its officers), are generally protected by sovereign immunity, limiting liability to specific statutory exceptions, and underscoring that procedural errors cannot override this protection.
Background
In 2014, Mother and Son, while crossing an intersection in Philadelphia, were struck by a SEPTA bus making a left turn. Mother died instantly and Son sustained injuries. The Plaintiffs (representing Mother, Son, and the Estate), filed a civil action against the SEPTA Parties, the bus manufacturer, and Roscoe, Inc., the maker of the bus’s mirror system. SEPTA and the bus driver admitted negligence and conceded that the driver’s actions were a factual cause of the accident. As for Roscoe, the Plaintiffs alleged that the bus’s mirrors obstructed the driver’s view, contributing to the collision. It was claimed that SEPTA officers were negligent in permitting the continued use of the mirrors despite prior complaints, which they argued violated the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act (“MTAA”). The MTAA empowers SEPTA to take all acts necessary for the promotion of its business and general welfare. The Trial Court permitted the Plaintiffs to pursue a theory that SEPTA officers acted outside the scope of their statutory authority, potentially removing sovereign immunity.
The jury entered a verdict for the Plaintiffs. The jury, however, inconsistently found no liability for SEPTA officers, while assigning 23% liability to SEPTA for actions attributed to its officers. The Trial Court identified this inconsistency, dismissed the jury, and granted SEPTA’s Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reallocating the 23% liability to the driver and SEPTA on the driver’s behalf. This preserved total liability, but subjected Plaintiffs’ verdict to the statutory damage cap under the Sovereign Immunity Act. The Plaintiffs later sought a new trial based on the alleged inconsistency, and the Trial Court granted it, citing potential manifest injustice. The Court allowed the “outside-the-scope” theory to proceed despite the Plaintiffs having failed to preserve the issue at trial. SEPTA appealed, challenging both the new trial order and the Trial Court’s acceptance of the “outside-the-scope” claims against its officers.
Holding
On appeal, the Court addressed the issues of sovereign immunity and the propriety of the new trial. It emphasized that under the MTAA, SEPTA exercises public powers as a Commonwealth agency and is generally entitled to sovereign immunity unless expressly waived. Section 8522(b)(1) of the Sovereign Immunity Act permits tort claims only for vehicle operation, which the parties agreed applied to claims against the driver and SEPTA on the driver’s behalf. Other claims, including the White Parties’ theory concerning Roscoe’s mirrors, did not fall within any statutory exception. The Court rejected the argument that negligence alone could remove SEPTA’s immunity, noting that such a rule would eliminate sovereign immunity entirely and contradict legislative intent. Regarding the verdict and new trial, the Court observed that the jury had inconsistently apportioned liability, finding no fault for SEPTA officers, but 23% against SEPTA for their actions. The Trial Court initially corrected this through judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reallocating liability to the driver and SEPTA on the driver’s behalf, with damages subject to the statutory cap of $250,000 per plaintiff.
As for the Trial Court’s subsequent action in granting a new trial for potential manifest injustice, the Commonwealth Court determined that the Plaintiffs had waived this argument by failing to timely object at trial. Additionally, no manifest injustice occurred because the corrected verdict preserved the Plaintiffs’ recovery within statutory limits. Allowing a new trial for claims barred by sovereign immunity against SEPTA officers was legally incorrect. Thus, the Court ultimately held that the Trial Court erred in granting a new trial, reaffirmed the applicability of sovereign immunity for SEPTA and its officers, and confirmed that the statutory damage cap limited recoverable damages from the driver and SEPTA on the driver’s behalf.
Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.
Robinson v. Phila. Int’l Airport
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 263 CD 2022
Decided: June 9, 2025
Co-Defendant American Airlines waived its right to challenge the dismissal of the City of Philadelphia by failing to oppose the City’s Motion for summary judgment.
Background
This case arises out of a March 2019 slip and fall, whereby Plaintiff alleged that she fell on a slippery area on the tarmac at Terminal F of the Philadelphia International Airport, sustaining various injuries. Plaintiff sued the City and American Airlines, both of whom filed Cross-claims against the other. At the close of discovery, the City moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposed the Motion, but American did not, and the Motion was granted on the basis of governmental immunity and lack of control of the area where Plaintiff fell. Notably, the Judge did not grant the Motion as to the Cross-claim filed by American. After the Motion was granted, American filed a Motion in limine seeking to present evidence against the City, and to have the City listed on the verdict slip. A different Judge granted that Motion over the City’s objection. The City filed an interlocutory appeal.
Holding
The Commonwealth Court reversed the Order. First, the Court held that American waived the right to have the City on the verdict sheet by failing to either oppose its Motion for summary judgment, or to take an immediate appeal of the Order dismissing the City. However, the Court did note that American would have a right to appeal after the case concluded. Second, the Commonwealth Court found that the Judge who granted the Motion in limine violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. This rule prohibits judges of the same court from overruling one another on the same issue in the same case. The Motion for summary judgment and Motion in limine both dealt with the liability of the City to the Plaintiff and to American. That the Motion for summary judgment filed by the City was granted meant that there was no liability for the City, and accordingly, the subsequent Motion in limine should have been denied.
Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at (610) 332-7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.
Conklin v. Wawa, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 339458, 2025 WL 2237319
Decided: August 6, 2025
It was appropriate to not give a spoliation jury instruction where the Plaintiff did not establish that video surveillance would have provided relevant information in a trip and fall case.
Background
The Plaintiff alleged that she tripped and fell over a floor mat while inside a Wawa convenience store. The store’s loss prevention officer viewed video surveillance from inside the store, but determined that the fall area was not captured on video. The store refused to release the video surveillance to the Plaintiff pre-suit. After suit was filed and the video surveillance was requested in discovery, it was determined that the loss prevention officer failed to preserve video from inside the store and instead, accidentally saved video surveillance from a different store’s location. The Plaintiff requested that an adverse inference jury instruction be given, arguing that the store spoliated evidence by failing to preserve the correct video. The Trial Court denied the request. Subsequent thereto, the Trial Court entered a judgment for the store and the Plaintiff appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to refuse an adverse inference jury instruction, as the Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the video surveillance contained relevant evidence. Put otherwise, Plaintiff did not produce evidence or testimony as to what the lost video, which undisputedly did not show the accident, could have shown. Moreover, the failure to preserve the video was a result of confusion, not bad faith.
Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.
Borth v. Alpha Century Sec., Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2044 EDA 2022
Decided: August 1, 2025
The Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that Rite Aid is liable for a third party criminal act that occurred a block from its premises.
Background
Plaintiff Patricia Borth filed claims against Defendants Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., and its security subcontractors, Alpha Century Security, Inc. and Security Resources, Inc., for a December 16, 2017 incident. The Plaintiff was beaten and robbed by third party Albert Geiger one city block away from a Rite Aid store in Philadelphia, Pa. While the attack occurred well outside the store, surveillance footage showed that prior to the attack, Mr. Geiger had followed Ms. Borth around inside the store. The security guard who was on duty at the time admitted that he thought it was “odd” and “suspicious” that Mr. Geiger “stood there with a [cigar]” and “walked out” after Ms. Borth did so. He further admitted that he had not received any training from Rite Aid or his employer. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment on all claims against Rite Aid and Alpha Century Security, Inc. and Security Resources, Inc., on the grounds that the attack was unforeseeable as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed.
Holding
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed on all claims, including punitive damages. Under Pennsylvania law, a landowner who voluntarily offers security services for the protection of invitees is liable “where a harm follows a reasonable expectation of that harm.” Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. 1984). Applying this standard, the Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s harm was reasonably foreseeable. The Court relied on the security guard’s admission that Mr. Geiger acted suspiciously by leaving the store after Ms. Borth without buying anything, as well as the guard’s testimony that he did not receive any security training. It also cited expert testimony that the subject store is located in a high crime area. Per the Court, a reasonable jury could find that a properly trained security guard would have detected that Mr. Geiger was following Ms. Borth around in the store and taken appropriate measures, such as warning Ms. Borth or “suggesting she call for an escort.”
Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Soler at (267) 861-7583 or jsoler@tthlaw.com.
Heffelfinger v. Shen
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 153
Decided: July 21, 2025
Superior Court upholds $11.5 million verdict in medical malpractice suit.
Background
In 2021, Mary Heffelfinger filed suit against Dr. Linda Shen and her practice, Shen Smiles and Drums Dental Lab, alleging a cancerous lesion on her tongue was not diagnosed during oral cancer screenings at dental visits. Heffelfinger, a 68 year-old woman, claimed she was treated by Dr. Shen eight times over the course of seven months to address a lesion on her tongue, but Dr. Shen never referred her for a biopsy. In that time, the improperly treated sore developed into a stage four squamous cell carcinoma, requiring invasive treatment such as chemotherapy and a partial removal of her tongue.
Subsequent to the above, Dr. Shen initially conditioned the release of Heffelfinger’s dental records on the execution of a liability waiver. After Heffelfinger refused to sign the waiver, Dr. Shen claimed that she could not find the records and suspected that her sister, the front desk receptionist, stole them.
Following a three-day trial in February 2024, a jury delivered an $11 million verdict against Defendants. Specifically, the jury found Dr. Shen negligent and awarded Plaintiff $3 million in compensatory damages. The jury also found Dr. Shen’s reckless conduct warranted $8 million in punitive damages. Luzerne County Judge Richard M. Hughes III then granted a Motion and awarded $459,514 in delay damages to Heffelfinger, bringing the total award to nearly $11.5 million. Shen appealed raising 14 issues concerning the jury’s verdict and monetary award and the sufficiency of evidence proving the same. Specifically, it was argued that the award for delay damages was excessive and should be denied or reduced in light of COVID-19.
Holding
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld the $11.5 million verdict. The Superior Court underscored that in opposing the imposition of delay damages, it is the Defendant’s burden to establish: (1) that a requisite settlement offer had been made; or (2) that the Plaintiff was responsible for specified periods of delay. The Court further explained that the judicial emergency created by COVID-19 neither diminished the rights of plaintiffs to be made whole, nor prohibited defendants from engaging in settlement negotiations. As to the issue of compensatory and punitive damages, the Court explained that it will not find a verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court’s sense of justice. After a review of the totality of the record, the Court concluded that no abuse of discretion existed.
Questions about this case can be directed to Haley Obrzut at (717)-255-7646 or hobrzut@tthlaw.com.
Swatt v. Nottingham Vill.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1506 MDA 2021
Decided: July 2, 2025
Superior Court analyzes whether the gist of the action doctrine allows trial courts to convert contract claims into tort claims.
Background
In 2006, decedent Madlyn Blusius resided in an assisted-living center. Unfortunately, she fell, and was moved to a nursing care facility in Northumberland County for rehabilitation. In January 2012, Madlyn’s kidneys failed and she died in the nursing home. Seven weeks later, Attorney Janice M. Hawbaker, as Executrix, raised an Estate for Madlyn and hired Attorney J. McDowell Sharpe to sue the nursing home for Madlyn’s death. Nearly two years later, Attorney Sharpe filed a Praecipe with the Prothonotary to issue a Writ of Summons to the nursing home. A dispute arose between Attorney Hawbaker and Madlyn’s family over who should administer the Estate. Franklin County Orphans’ Court appointed Elizabeth, Madlyn’s sister, as Administratrix pro tem of the Estate of Madlyn for the sole purpose of pursing any causes of action against the nursing home or any provider between January 1, 2004 until her death.
After some confusion with filings and counsel of record, there were multiple dockets related to this dispute. The operative Complaint brought by Elizabeth in the Swatt matter, dated May 13, 2024, contained allegations of medical malpractice, a survival action, and a breach of contract action. The pleadings and discovery were lengthy in this matter, spanning over five years. In June 2020, the nursing home moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff brought a breach of contract action “in an attempt to shoehorn [the] time-barred negligence cause of action into a breach-of-contract claim.” The Trial Court granted summary judgment, stating that the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims barred the counts for malpractice and that the gist of the action doctrine prevented the breach of contract claim. An appeal was timely filed.
Holding
After an extensive discussion of the history of the gist of the action doctrine and its origin, the Superior Court discussed the “reformed” doctrine, as stated in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. In that case, the Supreme Court recalibrated the doctrine as a test based on the duty that the defendant allegedly breached. Notably, Bruno did not review whether the choice between tort and contract remedies are binary under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, due to the fact that the Brunos did not bring a breach of contract claim, the Court only decided whether a tort claim could exist when the parties had a contract. Based on this, the Superior Court held that contract claims never were, and are not now, subject to the gist of the action doctrine. Accordingly, the Lower Court’s dismissal of the contract claim was reversed, and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.