SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARY
Washington DC Case Summary
Zajac v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
D.C. Court of Appeals
No. 2023-CAB-001468
Decided: November 13, 2025
Denying a motion to file an amended complaint on the basis that it contradicted Plaintiff’s original complaint constituted abuse of discretion.
Background
Pro se Plaintiff was hired as a student associate by Defendant law firm in 2016. Per the terms of his initial offer, Plaintiff was promised an annual salary, eligibility for the firm’s bonus plan, and reimbursement for law school credits if he met grade and work performance requirements. The offer letter indicated that it was not a contract of employment.
Plaintiff was promoted to associate in 2019 following his graduation from law school. According to the Plaintiff, it was understood that associates who reached certain billing thresholds would receive corresponding productivity bonuses. However, despite reaching one of the understood thresholds, Plaintiff did not receive a productivity bonus in 2019. Additionally, Plaintiff became embroiled in a dispute with Defendant regarding the tuition reimbursement promised in his student associate offer letter, which Plaintiff claimed cost him tens of thousands of dollars.
Plaintiff’s employment ended in March of 2020. Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting two counts of wage theft under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”). Defendant filed a Motion to dismiss, stating that the disputed monies were discretionary and not “wages” under the DCWPCL. In opposition, Plaintiff claimed he could plead additional facts to defeat the Motion, but did not include an amended complaint. He further claimed that his offer letter did not qualify the bonuses as discretionary, though the letter had been “destroyed.” Defendant’s Reply included a copy of a standard 2018 letter, which claimed that bonuses were awarded at their discretion.
Holding
The Trial Court agreed that the productivity bonus was discretionary and that the tuition reimbursements were expense reimbursements, and therefore neither qualified as a wage under the DCWPCL. Accordingly, the Motion to dismiss was granted. The Court then considered whether to grant leave to amend the Complaint. In the proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledged that the offer letter was not a contract, but that he had received oral promises of mandatory bonuses from management. Defendant argued the Motion to amend should be denied, because the new Complaint contradicted the Original Complaint’s claim that the 2016 offer was a binding contract. The Trial Court agreed, and denied the Motion to amend. The Trial Court stated that under federal precedent, the contradictions between the two versions of the Complaint provided grounds for denial. The Court also concluded that an amended complaint would be futile because it could not overcome the deficiency that the disputed payments were discretionary.
The Court of Appeals held that the Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the Motion for leave to amend the complaint. The Court held that the Trial Court’s application of federal case law was inappropriate because the cases in question were non-binding, and further contradicted the policy preferences articulated in District of Columbia precedent. The Trial Court had read the federal case law to mean that any contradiction of the Original Complaint is enough to prevent amendment. However, the District prefers that cases be decided on the merits, to the point that there is a presumption that leave to amend should be granted. Denial requires consideration of an established five-factor test, those factors being: (1) the number of requests to amend; (2) the length of time the case has been pending; (3) the presence of bad faith or dilatory motive; (4) the merit of the proposed amended pleading; and (5) prejudice to the non-moving party. The Trial Court erred by focusing narrowly on the third and fourth factors, pointing out the perceived failure to cure deficiencies and contradictory nature of the Amended Complaint. The Appellate Court held that minor contradictions are permissible if they are not so fundamental as to indicate bad faith. Plaintiff’s change in the details of how the offer was made did not constitute a “180 degree change” indicating such bad faith. These changes to minor details designed to address deficiencies in the Original Complaint did not indicate bad faith or abuse of the system, and therefore should have been permitted.
Applying de novo review, the Court further held that amendment would not be futile because the proposed Amended Complaint plausibly stated claims under the DCWPCL. The amended allegations sufficiently argued that disputed money could be defined as “wages,” notwithstanding the employer’s claim of discretion. Therefore the Amended Complaint presented a factual dispute unsuitable for resolution at the pleadings stage. Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision to deny the Motion to amend the Complaint was reversed and remanded.
Questions about this case can be directed to Sean Raftery at 443.641.0577 or sraftery@tthlaw.com.