SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Washington, DC Case Summary

Ramey v. Foxhall Urology
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
No. 23-CV-0672

Decided: April 24, 2025

Trial Court’s failure to enforce a pre-trial waiver of an argument that is then presented to a jury may be grounds for a new trial.

Background

Plaintiff sued Defendants after undergoing a urethral dilation surgery in 2003. She experienced pain and other issues immediately after the procedure, and while she recovered in the short term, she continued to experienced pain for a number of years. During those years, Plaintiff spoke with dozens of doctors, and underwent numerous tests, to investigate her symptoms. None of those professionals related her ongoing pain to the urethral dilation procedure performed in 2003. In 2016, Plaintiff underwent surgery with a Dr. Dellon. Dr. Dellon removed a large fibrous tissue and scarring mass from Plaintiff. Dr. Dellon concluded that the scar tissue was related to a negligently performed urethral dilation. Plaintiff then sued Defendants in 2019.

Statute of limitations issues dominated the trial and centered around the discovery rule. In the District, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of an injury. However, since some injuries are not clearly related to the tortious conduct that causes them, the discovery rule may apply to toll the statute of limitations until either actual or inquiry notice occurs. Those are distinct concepts. Actual notice means that the Plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause of action. Inquiry notice means that certain facts should trigger a Plaintiff’s obligation to make a reasonable investigation into the possible existence of a cause of action. Thus, a Plaintiff is charged with knowledge she does not have, but that she would have discovered had she exercised reasonable diligence in acting on the information available to her.

In this case, during a pre-trial motions hearing, defense counsel stated they would consider waiving an argument about inquiry notice of claims, suggesting that they would instead focus on Plaintiff’s actual notice. However, at trial during opening and closing arguments, defense counsel told the jury that if Plaintiff had gone to a lawyer and received the proper testing, she would have discovered the connection between the urinary dilation procedure and her medical injuries within the statute of limitations period. This invoked the concept of inquiry notice before the jury. Rather than striking the offending statement, or allowing Plaintiff’s counsel a second closing argument to respond, the Trial Judge simply reiterated to the jury the full discovery rule standard, which is neutral in terms of distinguishing between actual or inquiry notice. The jury then found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

After that verdict, Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Plaintiff’s Motion for judgment asserted that Defendants had not met their burden of proof in asserting that there were alternate causes of Plaintiff’s injury that preceded the urinary dilation procedure. The Court denied the Motion in part. In doing so, it relied on evidence that Plaintiff’s parents, as doctors, had told their daughter that her pain was related to the urinary dilation. Further, Plaintiff had adopted that position and discussed it amongst friends. Relying on this evidence, the Court could not say as a matter of law that Defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the statute of limitations began to run before Dr. Dellon rendered his opinions. The Court also denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a new trial, which was based upon three arguments: inadequate jury instructions, frequent misstatement of language surrounding the law as related to actual or inquiry notice, and an issue regarding expert witness testimony. The Court rejected all three arguments. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals overturned only the Trial Court’s holding on the Motion for a new trial. It did so after holding that defense counsel had waived their arguments rooted in inquiry notice, making their references to inquiry notice improper. A new trial was warranted because the Trial Court failed to enforce the Defendants’ waiver of inquiry notice and because the jury may have impermissibly implemented the inquiry notice standard, rather than the actual notice standard, in reaching its decision.

Questions about this case can be directed to Joseph Mooradian at (202) 318-1751 or at jmooradian@tthlaw.com.