eNotes: Pennsylvania – Liability – May 2025

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

PENNSYLVANIA CASE SUMMARIES

Landon v. Soluciones Cosmeticas
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1545 M.D.A. 2023

Decided: March 28, 2025

Pennsylvania Superior Court confirms that “promptness” in transferring cases from Federal Court to State Court is determined on a case-by-case basis as the statute dictating transfers does not outline a timeframe.

Background

The parents of Plaintiff-decedent brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, against a hand sanitizer manufacturer and numerous other parties believed to be in the distribution chain, due to the death of their child from drinking the hand sanitizer. The District Court dismissed the federal action for lack of diversity jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs commenced litigation in State Court in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas, via a Praecipe to transfer. The Praceipe was filed with the Adams County Prothonotary’s office with the supporting federal documents; however, the documents were not certified by the District Court. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to strike the Praecipe to transfer due to failure to conform with the transfer requirements under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b) and, specifically, the failure to promptly transfer as well as the failure to provide certified documents from the District Court. The Trial Court ultimately addressed the Preliminary Objections on briefs, sustained the Objections, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice, marking the matter closed. Essentially, the Trial Court believed that while there was “some” prompt effort on the part of Plaintiffs, the 61-day period between the January 18, 2023 federal dismissal and the commencement of the state action on March 23, 2023 evidenced a lack of good faith. Therefore, Plaintiffs presented a single question for review to the Superior Court as to whether the Superior Court should overrule the Trial Court’s holding and find that the case was properly and promptly transferred pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b).

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that it must determine if the Trial Court sustained Defendants’ Preliminary Objections as an error of law. Critically, the statute lacks a definite time frame, and the Trial Court ignored Plaintiffs’ persistent efforts to comply with the statute despite administrative delays on behalf of the District Court outside of their control. Plaintiffs believe that the “undisputed details of their efforts show that [they] were as prompt as humanly possible, despite numerous inadvertent administrative mistakes,” such as errors on behalf of the District Court in not timely sending certified documents. Plaintiffs support this contention by showing that as soon as the District Court indicated that it planned to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction in January 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel immediately informed the other parties of his intent to transfer to State Court. The record also showed numerous occasions where Plaintiffs’ counsel called the District Court to inquire about the transfer of the certified record and kept the Adams County Prothonotary up to date on its status.

The Superior Court ultimately agreed with Plaintiffs. Although the Trial Court recognized the absence of a specific period to perfect the transfer and noted legislature of the Commonwealth’s failure “to act in this area despite [our] prompting,” the Trial Court nevertheless imposed a thirty-day time limitation as an alternative basis to dismiss the action. As there is no authority to dismiss an action for a two-month delay in transferring a case from Federal Court pursuant to Section 5103(b), the Superior Court believed that Plaintiffs made a good faith effort to promptly transfer. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the Trial Court’s Order and remanded the case back to the Adams County Court of Common Pleas.

Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.

Surefire Dividend Capture, LP v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1222 WDA 2025

Decided: March 10, 2025

In this published decision, the Superior Court held that a Writ of Summons is not a pleading and cannot be amended via Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033.

Background

Surefire Dividend Capture, LP (collectively with other Plaintiff-Appellees “Surefire”) initiated a lawsuit by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons naming PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. as the sole Defendant. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. was served with the Writ of Summons. Nearly two years later, Surefire filed a Motion to amend the Writ of Summons to correct the name of PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. to PNC Bank, N.A. Surefire’s Motion to amend alleged that it complied with Rule 1033 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring either consent of the adverse party or leave of court to change the form of the action.

Surefire’s Motion to amend stated that the civil suit related to an allegation of hedge fund fraud perpetuated by non-parties to the lawsuit, and that PNC Bank, N.A. was the epicenter of the non-parties Ponzi schemes. Surefire contended that their investments in the hedge funds were accepted and held on deposit at PNC Bank, N.A. in accounts opened and managed by the non-parties who then misappropriated the funds. Surefire filed the action against PNC Bank, N.A. for its role in the non-parties fraud, alleging PNC Bank, N.A. knew of and substantially assisted the underlying wrongdoing by the nonparties. Surefire alleged that after the Writ of Summons was filed naming PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., additional investigation was conducted resulting in the determination that the specific PNC entity should be correctly identified as PNC Bank, N.A., not PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. Surefire claimed that the confusion arose because PNC conflates the two names and uses them interchangeably.

PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. filed a response in opposition to Surefire’s Motion arguing that Surefire cannot amend a Writ of Summons pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033, as a Writ is not a pleading; that the statute of limitations on Surefire’s claims against PNC Bank, N.A. had expired; and that Surefire knew nearly two years before the filing of the action that PNC Bank, N.A. was the party with which the accounts were held, as evidence by the fact that Surefire Capital directed Subpoenas in an earlier arbitration action to “PNC Bank.”

On May 31, 2023, the Trial Court granted Surefire’s Motion, allowing the Writ of Summons to be amended to “the correct name” of PNC Bank, N.A. PNC appealed the interlocutory Order with permission to the Superior Court asking if Pennsylvania law authorizes a Writ of Summons to be amended to name a new and different party-defendant after service of the Writ on another and entirely distinct Defendant before a Complaint has been filed and served.

Holding

The Superior Court’s review of a trial court order concerning a question of law is de novo and the scope is plenary. When interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Courts are guided by the intentions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; the plain language of the rule; and the rules of grammar and common and approved usage. Pa.R.J.A. 108 and 106(a).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033 allows a party, either with consent or leave of court, to at any time change the form of action, add a person as a party, correct the name of a party, or otherwise amend the pleading. The Superior Court reiterated that “pleading” is a technical, legal word defined by Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017, which limits a pleading to a complaint and answer; reply; counter-reply; preliminary objection and response thereto. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017. Coupled with the rules of grammar, the Superior Court concluded that a Writ of Summons is not a pleading, and is not encompassed by Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033. The Trial Court’s Order allowing amendment of the Writ of Summons was vacated.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. 48

Decided: February 26, 2025

Lower UM/UIM elections valid for the life of the insurance policy.

Background

This civil action arises from a claim for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits following an accident that occurred in 2018. The McNears had purchased an automobile insurance policy in 2012 from Goodville Mutual, electing reduced UIM coverage limits of $50,000/person and $100,000/accident. Over the years, they added and removed vehicles from the policy. Goodville did not obtain new limited UIM elections when the McNears added vehicles to their policy, nor did the McNears affirmatively request changes to their UIM benefits or other coverages. Following a 2018 accident, the McNears sought UIM benefits, contending that each addition of a new vehicle constituted a “purchase” of coverage requiring a new lower limits election under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1734. They argued that Goodville Mutual’s failure to obtain new elections rendered the original elections ineffective, entitling them to stacked UIM benefits totaling $250,000.

On May 25, 2023, the Trial Court granted Goodville’s Motion for summary judgment and denied the McNears’ Cross-Motion. The Court rejected the McNears’ reliance on Barnard v. Travelers and instead followed the Third Circuit’s decision in Geist v. State Farm, which held that Barnard did not apply to UIM coverage selections. The Court distinguished Sections 1734 (governing UIM coverage) and 1738 (concerned with stacking), noting they impose different duties. The Trial Court found that the McNears’ original selection of limited UIM coverage remained valid, and Goodville had no duty to reissue notices when vehicles were added to the policy.

Holding

The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the validity of an insured’s original UIM coverage limits election under Section 1734, despite subsequent additions of vehicles to the policy. The defense successfully argued that a new election form was not required with each policy change, as the initial election remained effective and the insured received appropriate notice under Section 1791. The Court distinguished this case from Barnard, reaffirming that vehicle additions alone do not constitute new “purchases” of coverage requiring updated elections.

Questions about this case can be directed to Sarah Cobbs at (412) 523-9136 or scobbs@tthlaw.com.

Selbovitz v. Streamline Sols., LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1431 EDA 2023

Decided: February 25, 2025

Pennsylvania Superior Court affirms denial of insurance carrier intervention where insurer waited until trial began to attempt intervention.

Background

This case arises out of alleged construction defects to several homes in a newly developed community in Philadelphia. The homeowners sued several of the development companies involved in the construction of their homes under various theories. The insurance company for the developers sought to intervene in the lawsuit for the purpose of having special jury instructions and interrogatories issued. This attempt at intervention was made on the second day of the jury trial, after several of Plaintiffs’ witnesses had already testified. Plaintiffs objected to the intervention on the basis that it was untimely and that the insurer knew of coverage issues months before trial and should have attempted intervention earlier. Plaintiffs also alleged that intervention would be prejudicial as trial was underway. The Trial Court agreed that the proposed intervention was too late and that the late intervention would prejudice Plaintiffs.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed. The Court held that Rule 2327 permits an insurer to intervene in a case for the purpose of issuing special interrogatories to address which damages are covered versus not covered by a given insurance policy. However, Rule 2329 does provide discretionary limitations to intervention. In this case, the insurer waited until trial had already begun, and several of Plaintiffs’ witnesses had testified, before attempting to intervene. The insurer was aware nearly a year beforehand of the potential coverage issues related to the case but did not move to intervene at any point. This constituted undue delay by the insurer and Plaintiffs were able to effectively argue that timely intervention could have changed their trial strategy. As the delay amounted to prejudice, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of intervention on that basis.

Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at (610) 332-7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.

Whittington v. Daniels
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1734 MDA 2022

Decided: February 19, 2025

Filing an MDJ Complaint tolls statute of limitations, though the statute will begin to run again where an appeal is filed.

Background

In this case, Plaintiffs entered into a contract for the construction of a new home. In doing so, Plaintiffs entered into a standard agreement for the sale of new construction. Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit on the home, while Plaintiffs allege that the $10,000 went toward upgrades on a new construction townhome. On April 10, 2017, the pro se Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with a Magisterial District Justice (“MDJ”), seeking return of the $10,000. On June 27, 2017, the MDJ found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded them $10,000 in damages. On July 13, 2017, Defendant appealed and filed a Rule to file a Complaint, which Plaintiffs did not do. Defendant ultimately moved for a directed verdict based on the date of accrual.

On appeal, the Court was faced with issues of first impression as to whether filing an MDJ Complaint tolls the statute of limitations, and whether an appeal from an MDJ Complaint is perfected if the Plaintiffs fail to file a timely Complaint and the Defendant does not file a Praecipe for entry of a judgment of non pros.

Holding

The Court held that the filing of a MDJ Complaint does, in fact, toll the statute of limitations. However, the claim may still be barred by the statute if an appeal is filed and a plaintiff fails to file a complaint within the 20 days stated in the Rules. This is the case even if the defendant does not file a Praecipe for the entry of a judgment of non pros. In this matter, where Defendant filed an appeal from the MDJ ruling, a directed verdict was entered in favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs did not file a Complaint within 20 days of the appeal and within the statute of limitations.

Questions about this case can be directed to Haley Obrzut at (717)-255-7646 or hobrzut@tthlaw.com.

Lorenzo v. Kochersperger
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 676 EDA 2023

Decided: December 17, 2024

Plaintiffs must exercise reasonable diligence to toll the statute of limitations under the discovery rule.

Background

Plaintiff, John Lorenzo, owns a vacant parcel of land adjacent to property owned by Defendants, the Kocherspergers, and another property owned by the Quinbys. Plaintiff became suspicious that either Defendants or the Quinbys installed an illegal septic system and/or drain field on his property, which caused sewage effluent to flow onto his property. The Department of Health (“DOH”) conducted extensive dye testing at both Defendants’ property and the Quinbys’ property. A DOH supervisor testified that a faint amount of dye was discovered in the ditch in front of Plaintiff’s property and a septic system was identified. Though he could not definitively say from which property the dye-laced effluent came, he testified that he would assume that it was from Defendants’ property based on the amount of dye they had put in Defendants’ lines, the amount of groundwater present, and the fact that Plaintiff’s property was downslope from Defendants.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint and, thereafter, several Amended Complaints, against Defendants, asserting claims for negligence, negligence per se, private nuisance and trespass. The Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in February 2023, due to Plaintiff’s lack of evidence and because Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. As part of its analysis, the Trial Court found the discovery rule to be inapplicable. The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations from running where the injury or cause of injury was not known nor reasonably knowable. Such tolling is only available to plaintiffs who exercise reasonable diligence. If a party has the means of discovery within his/her power, but neglects to use it, the claim will still be barred. Here, the Trial Cout found the discovery rule inapplicable since the Plaintiff knew of his claims against Defendants in 2016. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.

Holding

The construction of the subject part of the septic system that intruded upon Plaintiff’s property constituted a permanent trespass, since the construction was done once and produced a permanent injury to Plaintiff’s land. Based on the finding that the trespass was permanent in nature, the Superior Court held that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. However, the Superior Court found that the drain field constituted a continuing private nuisance and thus, that claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Regarding Plaintiff’s negligence claims, the Superior Court found that these claims were also barred by the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff was aware of these claims in 2016, but did not commence a civil action until 2019.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.